Middle East Transparent - Central Asia goes non-nuclear

17 September 2006

Central Asia goes non-nuclear

Celebrating the I5th anniversary of the ending of nuclear testing at the Kazakh city of Semipalatinsk, where the former Soviet Union had conducted nearly 500 nuclear tests, the five ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia signed, on September 8, a treaty on establishing a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ).

By signing the treaty, the states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan committed themselves to not developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquiring, or keeping any nuclear weapon or device within their borders. This is a significant development because it creates the world’s fifth nuclear-free zone, something that will hopefully strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhance global and regional peace and security. Since the emergence of the idea in the middle of the 1960s, the world has witnessed the birth of nuclear-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa. The zones, including CANWFZ, involve some 100 countries and cover nearly half of the earth’s surface.

The parties to the treaty, on the other hand, represents a model contrary to that represented by Iran and North Korea, both of which have been acting irresponsibly by refusing to halt their nuclear programmes. By voluntarily giving up the ambition of joining the nuclear club, the five Central Asian nations have proved that they are more concerned about peaceful coexistence and regional and global stability than Tehran and Pyongyang. This despite the fact that they are surrounded by four nuclear powers – Russia, China, India, and Pakistan – and are capable of entering a nuclear race with them. In addition to their experience and knowledge inherited from decades of housing thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons and facilities, the five states are known for their rich reserves of uranium which is used in the production of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan, for example, has the world’s second-largest reserve of the mineral and is the world’s third-largest producer.

Like any nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, the CANWFZ treaty requires the world’s five officially recognized nuclear powers to sign an accompanying protocol pledging to respect the pact and not to attack or threaten signatories with nuclear weapons. While Russia and China have given their full blessing and support to the treaty, the US, Britain, and France have expressed their disagreement on the pretext of a loophole in the treaty, which could allow Russia to transport or even deploy nuclear weapons across the five states under provisions of an older security agreement, namely the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (TCST).

It must be remembered that negotiations over the creation of a CANWFZ, which was first proposed by Uzbek President Islam Karimov at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly in 1993, have largely been influenced by regional and global developments, rivalry among the five Central Asian states and their different approaches to relations with Russia, and ambiguous positions of the five nuclear powers. With the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 and consequent changes of the geopolitical balance in Central Asia, including the American military presence in the region and Russia’s support for the US-led anti-terrorism campaign, these factors became less influential and efforts to finalize a 1997 draft CANWFZ treaty have accelerated.

The original text of the draft, therefore, has been amended several times between 2002 and 2005 in order to meet all concerns voiced by the five nuclear powers and consequently win their endorsement to the treaty. In fact, the Central Asian republics tried their best in this regard, bearing in mind that some of these powers had refused to sign the protocols to the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-free Zone treaty on the grounds that its terms could be interpreted as interfering with freedom of the seas.

This explains why the establishment of the CANWFZ has taken so long. It also explains the ambiguous language in the treaty, which has provoked the Western nuclear powers’ dissatisfaction. Washington, as well as London and Paris, argue that several articles or clauses of the treaty need to be revised or deleted as they appear to contradict one another. This is true, especially when one examines Article 12. The latter has two clauses contradicting to each other. While one states that the CANWFZ treaty will not affect the rights and obligations of the signatories under previous international agreement - thus allowing the possible deployment or transit of Russian nuclear weapons through the zone according to the TCST - the other states that the signatories agree not to take any action that may undermine the fundamental purpose of the treaty – thus ruling out redeployment of any nuclear weapons in the zone.

Regardless of such an argument, the establishment of the CANWFZ is a very important step towards making our planet safer and must not be blocked by any power. It should rather be welcomed and supported, especially at this time when radical regimes and terrorist groups’ appetite for the possession of nuclear weapons is on the increase.

elmadani@batelco.com.bh

*Academic researcher and lecturer on Asian affairs

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