20 November 2005

Implications of Afghanistan's inclusion in SAARC

By Dr. Abdulla Al-Madani*

Afghanistan was recently approved as the eighth member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a largely toothless body set up in 1985 which includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The decision, taken last week at the organization's 13^th summit meeting in Dhaka, implies several things.

First, it is recognition that Afghanistan is closer, geographically, historically and culturally, to the Indian sub-continent than any other region, and that issues which have long prevented it from becoming part of the grouping (such as its civil war, instability, chaos, and brutal regimes) no longer exist.

Second, it is an indication that SAARC members are concerned about Afghanistan's development and integration with its South Asian neighbours, something without which regional peace and stability cannot be enhanced. Kabul's bid for membership of SAARC, on the other hand, was motivated by similar concerns. By being a member, Afghanistan can benefit from the various SAARC development programmes, as well as from any collective anti-terrorism measures, and consequently promote its own security. And under the existing free trade agreement (Safta) for the South Asian region, it may have a better chance to negotiate a land route to India via Pakistan and a seaport facility in the latter. Islamabad has so far denied Afghanistan and India overland access to each other, saying the policy is linked to the broad matrix of India-Pakistan relations.

Third, it is a reflection of the emerging understanding between India and Pakistan, SAARC's major pillars. Unlike in previous meetings when hostility and distrust between the two countries had paralyzed the organization and prevented agreement on substantial issues, in the Dhaka meeting both backed the issue of Afghanistan's membership, albeit from different perspectives. Islamabad's backing was probably aimed at making Kabul's trade policy becoming Pakistan-centric and rebuilding the influence it once had in Afghanistan, while New Delhi's backing stemmed from its policy of supporting the post-Taliban government in Kabul and probably from its view of Afghanistan as a key link to energy rich Central Asia.

The same could be said about another issue that also took centre stage at both the Dhaka ministerial and summit meetings; China's observer/dialogue partner status with SAARC. The issue was proposed by Pakistan on the pretext that giving Beijing such a status would enhance SAARC's profile and influence internationally, while the covert reason must have been bringing in China as a counter-weight in the organization to neutralize Indian domination.

Despite its discomfiture on the issue, given its perceived policy of blocking China's keenness to nose its way into the sub-continent's affairs, New Delhi backed it. The move was said to be aimed at avoiding a misunderstanding with the Chinese, which might fall in the interest of other regional players, and maintaining Sino-Indian economic cooperation which has grown in recent years.

Fourth, it is proof that whenever SAARC's two most powerful members are in agreement over an issue, objections by smaller members, if any, can be contained or resolved. During the course of the summit meeting, Bangladesh, as well as Nepal, were lukewarm in their response to the issue of Afghanistan's admission.

The argument was that the SAARC charter required to be amended first, as there was no provision in it regarding an expansion of the grouping beyond the seven founding members. The real reason behind the two nations' reservations, however, was their fears that the entry of Afghanistan would increase India's balance of power in the regional body, given the post-Taliban government's warm ties with the Indians. Their positions were also attributed to fears of a possible reduction of their shares in the SAARC development assistance once impoverished and backward Afghanistan became a member.

On China's request to have a sort of association with SAARC, however, there was no opposition from Dhaka or Katmandu. In fact, the Nepalese pushed the issue forward as a price for their no-objection over Afghanistan's membership. Such a stand must be viewed within Nepalese King Gyanendra's new policy of leaning on the Chinese for moral and military support against the Maoist insurgents and pro-democracy movement in his country. It can also be viewed as a sign of Katmandu's anger and dissatisfaction with New Delhi's pressure for the restoration of democracy in the Himalayan kingdom.

*Academic researcher and lecturer on Asian affairs

elmadani@batelco.com.bh

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