08 January 2005

Plight of the Arab Liberal
Barry Rubin

 
 

The year 2004 may well be remembered as the time when the Arab reform movement really established itself. Although still weak, especially compared to their nationalist and Islamist rivals, the liberals have definitely established a foothold, developed their doctrine, and begun to organize.

     Whenever I mention the fact that I have just finished writing a comprehensive book on Arab liberals, someone invariably remarks, "It must be a very short book." My response is that while there are still relatively few outspoken reformers, their arguments are fascinating and the debates they have unleashed tell more about the Arab world than anything before.

     Their basic argument is a compelling one. For a half-century, the nationalist regimes that run the Arab world have been a disaster. In domestic terms, they have failed thoroughly to advance their societies and economies, which are now near the bottom of the world in almost every statistical measure. At a time when democracy is spreading across the globe, they unanimously remain dictatorships. On foreign policy, they have leaped into a series of costly, losing wars.

     But while the nationalist regimes are bad, the solutions proposed by the main, Islamist opposition are worse. It has no real answers for those societies' ailments and intends to impose an even harsher dictatorship. As if this were not enough, these countries are now the focal point of terrorism. Some states sponsor terrorism against other countries; some face internal terrorist threats which liberals attribute to the regimes' shortcomings and their people's desperate--if misguided--efforts to find some alternative to a thoroughly unsatisfactory status quo.

     Arab liberals have to deal with a wide range of difficult issues. What is their stance on: the problems of Arab societies, ways to fix them, Islam, the United States, Israel, women's rights, the conflict in Iraq, and many other issues? In each case, they must decide whether to confront or endorse the sacred cows of Arab ideology. There are no easy answers.

     Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict for example. Generally, liberals view the regimes' stand on this issue as a rationale for holding onto power, doing whatever they please, and rejecting any changes. They insist that the conflict be solved--and say that this would help the cause of democratization in the Arab world--but also demand that it not be an excuse for postponing reforms.

     There are four different arguments Arab liberals make about this issue, often moving from one to another despite the apparent contradiction of doing so:

     --Avoid the question altogether since they know that any moderate statements would be unpopular.

     --Declare that Israel is not a monster and that it is in the Arab world's, and the Palestinians, interests to make an equitable peace with it.

     --Insist that a democratic world would be better able to fight and defeat Israel, accusing the current regimes of preserving Arab weakness and making too many concessions.

     --Demand that the United States solve the issue for them because they know their own governments are unwilling to do so.

     Their difficulties in dealing with Islam and radical Islamist movements show a parallel pattern. Open secularists are rare. On Islam itself, they sometimes propose a strategy of reforming it into a more liberal religion or of reconfirming conservative, traditional Islam as preferable to the new radical Islamist version.

     Similarly, some liberals propose to work with Islamists who also say they want democratic elections, because they believe they would win them. In this case, liberals say that having to deal with practical politics or taking power would push Islamists into being more moderate. Other liberals, however, seek to ally with the incumbent regimes against Islamist insurgents, trying to convince the rulers that only democratic reforms can win over the people and ensure that extremists like Usama bin Ladin do not take power.

     Naturally, the regimes want to defeat this challenge. They employ a number of methods in doing so. One line of defense is to claim that their countries are already democracies or are making reforms themselves. They attempt to coopt the liberals and even go so far as to create official human rights' groups that never criticize their own state's behavior.

     Another way is to denounce the liberals as traitors, puppets of the West, agents of the Zionists, and enemies of Islam. They find a harder time publishing or getting good jobs. The last line of defense is to discourage activism through a wide range of repressive measures, though this is sparingly applied since liberals are viewed as far less tough than the Islamist opposition.

     Western, and especially American, support has been important in encouraging the democratic opposition. Again, opinions are divided. Some liberals openly urge the West to become involved; others insist that these actions are counterproductive. Many--perhaps most--of them hope Iraq will become the first truly democratic Arab state, while others opposed the war and harshly criticize U.S. policy there.

     At any rate, though, it is clear that this liberal, democratic, reformist movement is here to stay. The battle will be long, difficult, and victory is not assured. But these groups have already become a major contender in the Arab world's battle of ideas. Now they hope to become a factor in bringing about real change as well. 

December 21, 2004  

http://gloria.idc.ac.il/columns/2004/12_21.html

Reform of the Arab World

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