15 May 2007
Unquantified successes? How Iraq has been won!!
'Kerry's
and Kennedy's and democrats' shortsightedness on Iraq is a classic example of
instant gratification in politics. The real change of direction and leadership of
Iraqi Shiites to Sistani is the greatest victory of the new era of
constitutionalism and civility in Iraq. The shifting of Shiite Islam to Najaf,
instead of Qum, is a huge change and a direct result of Iraq's freedom that has
changed the balance of power in Iraq and Iran. The other day in the hinterland
of Gulf, a very senior Arab leader pointed to me, "Ike, when Saddam was
hanged, this was the first time in last five decades that an Iraqi leader was
brought to justice instead of being pulled on a road through street justice, a
civilized court and by a constitutionally elected tribunal disposed him."
Ironically, he was under American security until the last five minutes before
his hanging; the moment he was delivered to the Iraqis all civility had vanished. It looked like another elimination of an
Iraqi leader through a kangaroo court but it was actually the mob taking over
once the Americans were out of the picture in the last few minutes before his
hanging. Iraq stands at a crossroads ready for a big change, ready for a
renaissance; thoughtlessness of the political left is about to kill the waft of
freedom and new thinking in the region. Alteration of course and shifting
entrenched attitude takes time. Today...
In Tehran's storied central bazaar, an increasing number of merchants
are sending their religious donations, a 20 percent tithe expected from all who
can spare it, to Iraq's most senior Shi'ite cleric--rather than to clerics
closer to Iran's state power structure, said Jawad al-Ghaie, 48, a wholesaler
of false eyelashes and nail extensions and a respected lay donor.
Speaking carefully to avoid directly challenging the
Iranian government, he and several fellow merchants suggested that Iraq's Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani holds more spiritual sway because of his lifelong
commitment to quietism. That is the school of thought that says Shi'ite leaders
should stay out of government, and Sistani has stuck to it despite the great
temptation to wade into the chaos of Iraqi politics.
Yet even as the Times and its daughter paper report on
these excellent results of Iraq's liberation, the crazies on the Times
editorial page want to put the whole thing to a stop.
We Won't Take Any More of Your Shiite, Iran
The New York Times reports on an encouraging
development in Iraq:
The
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, one of the country's most
powerful Shiite parties, announced Saturday that "revolution" would
be dropped from its name and that Iran's top cleric would cease to be the
party's dominant spiritual leader.
The
Supreme Council was formed in Iran more than 20 years ago with a stated goal of
installing a government in Baghdad modeled on Iran's Islamic revolution. But
with Saddam Hussein gone and the newly named Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council
controlling roughly 25 percent of the seats in Parliament, the need for radical
change has passed, the group's leaders said.
"The
name should be consistent with the facts on the ground, so there is no need to
talk about revolution anymore," said Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer, a Supreme
Council leader in Parliament and a hard-line cleric. "The word means
change, and we have achieved the changes through the Constitution."
The
New York Times-owned Boston Globe reports from Tehran that the influence of
Iraqi Shiites is growing even there:
Some
Iranians are intrigued by the more freewheeling experiment in Shi'ite empowerment
taking place across the border in Iraq, where--Iraq's myriad problems
aside--imams can say whatever they want in political Friday sermons, newspapers
and satellite channels regularly slam the government, and religious observance
is respected and encouraged but not required.
May
be it was not a war against Islam but a war for Islam!
Apr
8, 2005
Iqbal
Latif- Zachary Latif, Paris
The soul of Saladin, the
Kurdish general revered throughout the lands of Islam should have been very
pleased. His descendents who were brutally murdered by gassing are now integral
part of a triumvirate that will now run Iraq. May be Iraq was not a war against
Islam but a war for Islam. Possibly "Qom Ayatollahs" could learn and
like to defuse their activism in favour of Sistanis "quietism." They
should look at Sistani's apolitical conduct and lack of lust for temporal
powers, he took a back seat as "politicians" conducted Iraqi
squabbling in typical parliamentarian smoke filled rooms. Instead, arguably the
centuries old feud of the control of "marjaiyya" and Najaf insistence
to wrest Shiite clerical control back from Qom will be the hall mark of new
ideological wrangling between two hearts of Shiite Islam, the militants of Qom
and the pragmatic of Najaf are draw into a new squabble. Baghdad will once
again take its role as the capital of Islam, with Kerbala and An-Najaf as the minarets
bellowing the cry of freedom to the oppressed Shi'ites of the world.
http://www.iranian.ws/cgi-bin/iran_news/exec/view.cgi/12/6311
Najaf
1 - Qom 0
Schism
within contemporary Shi'ism
Iqbal
Latif
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/iranian-question/2925-irans-threats.html
The
lingering conflict in Iraq, more than a year after the end of the year,
demonstrates the subtle dynamics of Iraqi Shi'ism and the extent to which it
affects power brokering in the Iraqi state. By handing over the keys to the Imam
Ali mosque, Iraq's holiest Shi'ite shrine, Sadr was transferring the
ideological legitimacy to the authentic victor of the Najaf uprising, Grand
Ayatollah Sistani.
To
create the waves of Shi'ite sympathy necessary for the success of his revolt
Sadr's strategy was to dare the Iraqi government to violate the Shrine: in
effect dare them to be barbarians. In the face of that challenge, Iraqi
government on one hand had to convince Sadr that they were prepared to cross
that line if it meant saving the integrity of Iraq or having Sistani intervene
on their behalf.
The
big question was will Sistani throw his weight behind beleaguered Allawi
regime? Or would he call for the mass uprising that could have change the course
of Iraq to exist as a unified entity. The stakes were high and so were the
repercussions.
Sadr
overestimated the degree of protection the mosque and its proximity to the
shrine afforded him, since it could be easily trespassed. His militias were not
protected by any physical boundary but by a sacred one from within the
sanctuary, which civilized men hesitate to cross. Mortars were fired from the
courtyard of the Imam Ali Shrine by men who didn"t even fortify their
positions, secure in the knowledge that they could slay men too decent to fire
back.
The
exemplary self restraint by the forces encircling the shrine discredited Sadr's
strategy to use the shrine as a shield to promote his delicate agenda of
ideological grandiosity. It was a rebuke to his strategy that Shiites refused
to descend on the shrine despite of his repetitive calls; a solitary call by
Ali Sistani was answered by thousands of weeping Iraqis. It was significant
that Grand Ayatollah Sistani, said to be under treatment in London, remained
largely silent on the fighting which had engulfed his religious capital, almost
as if the Pope had no comment on fighting raging through St. Peter's square.
Sistani's
timely stroke helped broker a deal that on surface looks a face saver for Sadr,
as he and his forces were being decimated, the deal allows Sadr to be a free
man despite his indictment for the murder of Khoei, for this concession he had
agree to surrender the mausoleum of Imam Ali, disarmament of his militia and
promise to join the mainstream Iraqi politics.
Scratching
the wounds a little deeper it was actually Sistani and Sadr who were fighting
for the heart and soul of Shiite mainstream sympathies; it is Sistani who has
emerged as winner and has emerged as the grandest of the Ayatollahs that has
the power to incite popular resistance.
Sadr
was perfectly aware that with impending denunciation his future role in Iraqi
politics was restricted, one collateral benefit from this peace deal brokered
by Ali Sistani is that he has been declared a free man. The individual victory
of escaping from a damning indictment aside his ideological power base has been
dented and exposed.
The
origin of the bloody feud is ensconced in ideological and individual vendetta.
Inspired by the religious leader Kazim al-Husseini al-Hairi of Qom, calling for
an Islamic government in Iraq some clerics, most notably the young Muqtada
al-Sadr of Najaf and Muhammad al-Fartusi in Baghdad, issued bold statements.
They moved to extend their influence in some Shi'ite cities in the south and in
the slum area of Baghdad known before the war as Saddam City (now renamed Sadr
City, after the religious leader Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was gunned down in
Najaf in 1999).
The
fierce struggle within Shi'ite religious circles took an ominous turn with the
murder of Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, son of Abu al-Qasim, who had been brought to
Najaf by American forces in the hopes that he would be able to exert his
influence in the city. The killing of Abd al-Majid, a man who exemplified the
sober and moderate face of Iraqi Shi'ism, has underscored the role of violence
in Iraqi politics as well as the difficulty of reaching an agreement with Sadr.
Sadr was accused of collusion in murder of Majid al-Khoei by an Iraqi judge.
This
was the final effort by Sadr to control of mainstream Shi'ism, the end game
between Sistani of Najaf and the Ayatollahs of Qum who were backing Sadr was an
effective coup d'état to bury "quietism" practiced by the al-Hawzah
al-'Ilmiyyah in Najaf. Qum was playing the game of ultimate ideological
supremacy through their proxy Sadr. Iraqi and Iranian Shi'ite strains have
little love lost for one another the differences borne out during the Iran-Iraq
War of 1980-88 and the 1991 Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq.
During
the war with Iran, Iraqi Shi'ites, who formed the rank and file of the Iraqi
infantry, fought against their Iranian coreligionists, demonstrating that their
loyalty to the Iraqi state overrode sectarian allegiance and their discontent
with the Sunni-dominated Baath regime. Iraqi Shiites are known historically for
their "Iraqi nationalism" whereas Iraqi Sunnis have looked towards
"Arab nationalism" as the clarion call.
To
understand the background of this schism between Qum and Najaf, one needs to
look profoundly at contemporary centers of Shi'ites learning's. Four senior
Grand Ayatollahs constitute the Religious Institution (al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah)
in Najaf, the preeminent seminary center for the training of Shiite clergymen.
Before the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Najaf was the most important center
of study for Shia religious leaders.
However,
Saddam Hussein ordered mass arrests and the expulsion of senior clerics, giving
the Iranian seminary in the city of Qom the opportunity to take over the
religious leadership of the Shias. Qom became the pre-eminent religious center
for Shia Muslims since the Iranian revolution, however, Najaf has a history of
more than a millennium of leadership, and the Iranian clerics who run the holy
city of Qum, are facing a revived rival.
As
of mid-2003 the seminary in Qom hosted between 40,000 and 50,000 clergy, while
the number in Najaf stood at about 2,000, down from about 10,000 before the
Ba'ath regime took. The first exodus from Qom to Najaf is expected to be by
exiled Iraqi clerics, estimated to number between 3,000, and 5,000.
At
the heart of schism lies reluctance of seminary of Najaf to get involved in
worldly affairs -- in essence al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah in Najaf wants to shield
the highest Shi'ite religious leadership, the marjaiyya, from politics - this
is an old tension within Shi'ite Islam between two conflicting tendencies,
quietism and activism.
Whether
clerics should confine their activities to religious affairs or also seek a role
in politics has been a matter of fierce debate among Shi'ites for well over a
century. Sunnis, who in theory are expected to obey their rulers and even
tolerate a tyrant in order to avoid civil strife and preserve the cohesion of
the Muslim community, observant Shi'ites recognize no authority on earth except
that of the imam.
The
twelfth imam is believed to be hidden from view and is expected to return one
day as a messianic figure, the Mahdi. In his absence, there can be no human
sovereign who is fully legitimate. This ambivalence toward worldly power has
resulted in different interpretations within Shi'ite Islam regarding government
accountability and the role of the clerics in state affairs. Imam Khomeini's
concept of the rule of the jurist is only one among several competing views.
Qom
is worried to face a challenge over the concept of the Velayat-e-Faqih - the
God-given authority for a top religious leader to oversee secular in the
absence of the Prophet Mohammad and infallible imams. The Najaf seminary's view
of the Velayat-e-Faqih is that of a supervisor and adviser. The Qom school
believes the opposite, with Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
officially considered as the highest religious authority of the world's Shias.
Qom sees the direct involvement of clerics in state ruling and executive
affairs as their legitimate right and moral obligation.
The
battle of wills in present altercation was undoubtedly won by the elder grand
Ayatollah Sistani and his favored doctrine of "quietism" won over
calls of "activism." From designed chaos aimed at popular uprising of
the South to peaceful withdrawal Sistani political maneuverings helped defuse
the crisis, in the process he has emerged as a new force to reckon with.
Iranian born Sistani plan to have higher goals his ambitions of Shiite heart
and soul stems from his desire to shift the thrust of Shiite theocracy from Qum
to Najaf and Karbela.
The
recent upspring of the Sadr rebels was a blatant attempt to rob Sistani of its
hardcore support, by showing Sistani soft on resistance Sadr purpose was to
build a momentum that would lead to popular mass uprising those intentions did
not materialize. Sistani call to "mass popular uprising for peace"
was a de-facto call for Sadr withdrawal, that Sistani achieved very
ingeniously, someone who is not even a born Iraqi to accomplish this
ideological following in Iraq is matchless.
This
is major victory of the al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah and the marjaiyya in Najaf over
that of Ayatollahs of Qom, this may not be the last one too, in political
pragmatism it is clear that Sistani keeps his cards very close his chest, when
he decides to play he plays them well too.
Posted
by MACHIAVELLIAN AFFLATUS
Paris