15
march 2007
Iraqis’ Progress Lags Behind Pace Set by Bush Plan
By HELENE COOPER and DAVID
E. SANGER
WASHINGTON,
March 14 — The Bush administration, which six months ago issued a series
of political goals for the Iraqi government to meet by this month,
is now tacitly
acknowledging that the goals will take significantly longer to achieve.
In
interviews this week,
administration officials said
that the military buildup intended to stabilize Baghdad and create
the conditions for achieving
the objectives would not be fully in place until June and
that all of the objectives would not be fulfilled
until the year’s end.
A
“notional political timeline” that the administration provided to Congress in January in an attachment to a letter from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, had called for most of the objectives to be met by this month.
Four
of the significant
objectives are final approval of an oil law regulating
distribution of oil revenues and
foreign investment in the oil industry;
reversal of the de-Baathification
laws that are widely blamed for alienating Sunnis by driving them out of government ministries; the holding of local elections; and reform of Iraq’s
Constitution.
A
Pentagon assessment of progress in Iraq through the end of last year, submitted to Congress on Wednesday, notes that
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
“has promised to reform his government, beginning with his cabinet and the ministries,” but that none of those steps had yet
happened. It cited the “passage of a framework” last month for sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s ethnic groups as a modest sign of progress, but notes that the last two months
of 2006, before Mr. Bush announced
his new strategy, “saw little progress
on the reconciliation
front.”
The report also described
some of what is happening in Iraq as a “civil war”
and described this past October
through December as the most violent three-month period since 2003.
In
interviews, officials said they expected most
political progress to be months away.
The slower pace of progress puts the
administration in a difficult position, at a time of growing Congressional criticism of the new strategy, which starts with
an increase of more than
20,000 American troops.
The slowness of political
progress, officials say, could indicate
the need to extend the time the new troops remain on the ground
in Baghdad and its suburbs. Congressional
Democrats are seeking
passage of legislation that
would impose a 2008 deadline for withdrawal
of American troops, and they are calling
for evidence that political benchmarks are being
met.
Mr.
Bush has told Congressional
leaders that such American demands are part of “a
culture of seeking instant results,”
officials who have met with him said.
Still, a House bill under consideration
this week lists benchmarks for Iraqi political progress and would require
Mr. Bush to certify by July 1 that
progress was being made. The bill would basically give Mr. Bush and the Iraqi government
a deadline of Oct. 1 to meet those
benchmarks.
Administration
officials have never rescinded the “notional timeline,” though the Iraqi
government had already missed most of the deadlines by the time Ms. Rice gave it to Congress in January. That document listed political achievements that Washington expected would be fulfilled between
September 2006 and March
2007; with the exception of
the oil law,
which awaits final passage,
most have not been achieved.
American and Iraqi officials had agreed on the
notional timeline back in October.
In
interviews, Bush administration officials said that the
House proposal was too rigid. “The
arbitrary setting of
deadlines is counterproductive,”
a senior administration official said Wednesday. “We need to see
that they are progressing,” the official said, but added that “we don’t
think rigid deadlines are appropriate.”
The Bush administration officials would agree to speak about the so-called benchmarks only on
condition of anonymity, because of the politically delicate debate about whether the United
States should be imposing deadlines on the Iraqi government. Indeed, even using
the words “deadlines” or “timetables” has become politically treacherous.
Part
of the problem is that some
administration officials are wary
of the response from Iraq’s governing Shiites if the Americans push
too hard, especially on rehabilitating past members of the Baath Party. That wariness
is particularly acute
because the administration is
pushing Iraqi Shiites to bring more Sunnis into the government,
as part of the political reconciliation process, at the same
time that they are cracking
down on Shiite militias.
But
in Baghdad, American officials seem increasingly willing to tolerate some of those Shiite militias as long as they patrol their
own neighborhoods.
Administration officials said
they had eased up on parts of the timetable for re-integrating
former Baathists, for fear
of a Shiite backlash. Immediately
after the American invasion four years ago, the United
States pursued the opposite
course by purging Baathists
from positions of power. As part of the recent reversal,
administration officials had
hoped that Prime Minister Maliki would quickly agree
to make room for more former Baathists
in the military and elsewhere in government.
“We’re
holding the Iraqis to their commitments on de-Baathification reform, and they’re making progress,” another senior
administration official said. “But we recognize that
pushing some issues too hard or too fast or with rigid
timelines can carry unintended consequences — such as intensifying the very sectarianism
we all want to dampen.”
One
Western diplomat in Baghdad
said: “We’d like to see Iraq develop a real moderate center. It may
not be realistic on this short a timetable.”
Philip
D. Zelikow, until December the counselor
at the State Department, said part of the delay stemmed
from “a recognition that things were worse
than people realized.”
“Significant parts of the new strategy need to be developed from
scratch,” he said.
There has been some progress
on the political timetable. On Feb. 26, the Iraqi cabinet approved a draft of the oil law. The
law approved by the cabinet allows the central government to distribute oil revenues to the provinces or regions based on population, which could lessen the
economic concerns of the Sunni Arabs,
who fear being cut out of Iraq’s vast potential oil wealth by the
dominant Shiites and Kurds.
But Parliament has yet to approve the law;
administration officials said
they hoped to see approval in the next few weeks.
The de-Baathification reversal will take much
longer, administration officials say. There are four competing proposals on reversing de-Baathification from various political groups, including one from an Iraqi commission that includes President Jalal Talabani, which American officials say is the
most promising. But Mr. Talabani
has been ill, which has slowed down progress on the reversal of de-Baathification.
On
local elections, the
official said that “Iraqis are working toward the end
of the year, and I think that’s
a very reasonable goal.” As
for constitutional reform,
administration officials say
they do not have a timetable
for its completion.
Alissa J. Rubin contributed reporting from Baghdad, and
Thom Shanker from
Washington.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/15/washington/15policy.html?_r=1&th&emc=th&oref=slogin
Sun, 18 Mar 2007 09:51:52 -0500
(Eastern Standard Time)
From: "Naim S. Mahlab" <nsm@videotron.ca>
The American invasion of Iraq has
changed the power structure
in the area for a long time
to come.
The main beneficiary
is Iran. Now that it has no neighbour who can
threaten it or stand up to it military, it
is likely to push its weight
around, as it has been doing.
If it ever
succeeds in building a nuclear
weapon then the political structure of the whole area will collapse.
Unfortunately for the
Americans, the rift along Sunni/Shiite lines has made stability in Iraq unattainable.
The Kurds
in the north are, for all intents, self governing. They are not likely to accept to go back to their previous status especially after what the Saddam regime did to them.
They have apparently made
new oil discoveries in the area they control which will make
them more independent. This,
of course, makes Turkey ill at ease
because it is bound to have en effect on the Kurdish population within Turkey itself.
With the
terror attacks taking place in Baghdad, the rift between the Sunnis and
Shiites has become, in my
opinion, unbridgeable.
The latter are now secure in the
fact that they are the numerical
majority and expect to continue to rule the country. The Sunnis who had
always had the reigns of power are not likely to accept their new inferior status. Supported as they are by Saudi petrodollars, they are likely to resist indefinitely.
One possibility the Americans should
consider is the realignment
of the
population division along religious
lines. The Anbar province of
Iraq can be united with Jordan under the Hashemite
Throne. Since they have also discovered some oil in the area, such a union will benefits both parties. A Sunni coalition including the Saudis, Jordan and Syria may
be able function very well without
the inclusion of the Shiite
population which will always be under
Iran's influence.
This realignment will allow for the pacification of the whole area
which will
give everyone a chance to work on developing the economic resources
under their control and, hopefully , permit the population to work in peace.
Naim S. Mahlab.
Montreal