Chemical Weapons, Drug Smuggling,
and Assorted Crimes of the Yemeni Dictator
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is
scheduled to visit the United States in November for a round of meetings with
President Bush and other high ranking US officials. As the representative of
the Yemeni people, Saleh deserves a great deal of respect and hospitality. Yet
it has become increasingly apparent that the regime, under the total domination
of President Saleh, is engaged in a wide variety of criminal activities to the
detriment of regional stability and the Yemeni people themselves.
Drug Smuggling: One regionally
destabilizing regime activity is drug smuggling. A variety of illegal drugs are
smuggled via the Indian Ocean into the southern Yemeni governate of Hadramawt. The
drugs are then transported inland to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States under the
supervision of a close relative of the president who is also responsible for
the governmental security apparatus, a well informed former regime official
reported. The Saudis regularly report seizing tons of drugs (as well as guns
and other prohibited materials) from Yemeni smugglers.
The profits from many illegal
transactions are thought to be laundered through real estate transactions by
front companies in Dubai. Once laundered, the money finds it way to bank
accounts in Europe, notably Germany.
Weapons Trafficking: Both the US and the UN have expressed
concern regarding the amount of illegal arms transfers from Yemen. The Yemeni
weapons pipeline has two sources of supply: the black market and legitimate
military purchases.
Published reports have indicated that
local gangs of arms traffickers in Serbia, Slovakia, Montenegro, Croatia and
Kosovo ship weapons from the ports in Montenegro and Croatia to Yemen. Additionally
some weapons purchased by the Yemeni military are diverted into the black
market. The serial numbers for two assault rifles used in an attack on the U.S.
consulate in Saudi Arabia have been traced to Yemen's Defense Ministry. Five U.S.
consulate employees died in the attack.
Independent analyst Shaun Overton
noted, "Many people believe that Yemeni military officers bear
responsibility for the distribution of weapons in the country. Arms can flow
legally into Yemen for the legitimate purpose of supplying the army." The
poorest nation in the Arab world, Yemen is among its top weapons purchasers. The
rise in Yemen's military budget, which tripled from 1998 to 2003, corresponds
with an increase in weapons trafficking activity, an enterprise reputedly
supervised by a close relative of President Saleh who is a top military leader.
The Yemeni weapons pipeline illegally
supplies weapons to various groups in the Sudan, Somalia, Palestine, Eritrea,
Saudi Arabia, and to al-Qaeda. According to Elaph, an Arabic website, "The
Saudis were very furious as the latest battles with terrorists in Saudi Arabia
revealed that all weapons and explosives used by the Qaeda fighters were bought
and smuggled from Yemeni arms markets." An Israeli military intelligence
official said "The weapons are smuggled by private gangs but with full
knowledge of the authorities..."
Illegal transfers are also made
directly by the military. A recent UN report noted that the Yemeni government
had admitted sending 5000 "personal weapons" to the government of
Somalia despite a U.N. weapons embargo. The weapons were delivered by the
Yemeni Air Force. The report also noted a much larger deal brokered between
Yemen and Somalia that included rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons, shoulder-fired
missiles and other armaments. Previously, Yemeni tanks discovered in the Sudan
were disavowed by the Yemeni government. In August, the Yemeni military banned
journalists from reporting on military topics without prior approval.
Support of Terrorists: It is no secret
that al-Qaeda affiliated members of the Yemeni military and security forces are
aiding terrorists. A Yemeni government official stated that "subversive"
(al-Qaeda) elements of Yemen's secret service have established training camps
for Iraqi Baathists who later fight in Iraq. Military analyst James Dunnigan
wrote recently, "There are many al Qaeda sympathizers in the Yemeni
military and government as well. These sympathizers have been discreetly aiding
Iraqi Baath Party officials who have fled Iraq, and now Syria. There has also
been some active, but covert, support for the terrorists operating in Iraq."
Dunnigan's assessment corresponds with
that of former Yemeni ambassador to Syria, Ahmed Abdullah al-Hasani, who
recently requested political asylum in London. A former commander of Yemen's
navy, al-Hasani stated at a press conference that "al-Qaida elements are
at the top in Yemen, in the army and political security forces." Yemeni
Socialist Party lawmaker Mohammed Salah, said "The government deals with
terrorists in a way to keep them under their control, to use them when it needs
to," the AP reported. Of 144 bank accounts in Yemen designated in 2004 by
the U.N. as related to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, Yemen has frozen one. It has
not restricted the activities or finances of U.S. classified "Major
Terrorist" Sheik Zindani, who remains a prominent politician and
businessman.
A recent study for the Center for
Strategic and International Studies by Anthony Cordesman found that 17% of
foreign fighters in Iraq were likely Yemeni. This figure does not account for
fighters of other nationalities trained in Yemen. Twenty suicide bombings in
Iraq were perpetrated by Yemenis, reported al-Thawry newspaper. Two individuals
charged with involvement in the Cole bombings who "escaped" along
with eight other suspects were later reported to have carried out suicide
bombings in Iraq which resulted in dozens of deaths.
Beyond training and support, there is
reportedly an established terrorist transit route through Yemen to Iraq. A
Saudi source recently told the London based Saudi paper Asharq Alawsat that
generally, “A young man decides he wants to fight in Iraq, illegally enters
Yemen, travels to Syria, and is subsequently smuggled across the border into
Iraq.â€
Counterfeit Money: The Central Bank of
Yemen distributed a substantial amount of forged currency to its clients. Confirmed
as forgeries by the Yemeni police, the bogus currency distributed by the Taiz
branch of the Yemen Central Bank was in both Saudi and Yemeni denominations,
according to al-Wahdawi news. Counterfeit Saudi riyals are thought to be
regularly smuggled into Saudi Arabia to be exchanged with authentic
denominations.
Adel al-Dhahab, the lawyer who had
handled counterfeiting cases for the Reserve Bank of Yemen in 2004, reported
that some of the counterfeit money stored for protection by the Reserve Bank
was stolen (and presumably re-circulated) by a high
ranking official in the Ministry of the Interior, until the prosecutor was
forced to stamp every bill as counterfeit to prevent such practices. Mr. al-Dhahab
also confirmed that the Central Bank is used as a mechanism of transferring and
investing the personal funds of top officials overseas.
Diesel Smuggling: Researcher Sarah Philips reported that
a well-informed ex-parliamentarian from the ruling General People's Congress (GPC),
said that "high-ranking regime officials smuggled large quantities of
subsidized diesel from Yemen's southern ports to the Horn of Africa,
transferring at least 20 to 30 percent of the public money used to pay for the
subsidies into their own pockets." She found that at a time when imports
of other products (including diesel consuming machinery) decreased slightly, "the
rapid increase in Yemen's diesel imports makes a circumstantial case" for
large scale smuggling.
Mr. Abduljabar Saad, Under Secretary
of the Finance Minister, in his resignation letter dated 8/16/2005 objected to
widespread corruption throughout the ministry. He also noted the large increase
in publicly subsidized diesel intended for the Yemeni public and he stated with
a fair amount of certitude that it "is being smuggled to neighboring
markets."
Chemical Weapons Use: It is questionable whether the Yemeni
military's response to the Houthi rebellion was proportionate, reasonable, and
justified. The primarily Shiite region of Sa'ada was decimated by a military
force comprised of former Iraqi military men, Afghan Arabs, and Yemeni military
personnel, under the leadership of General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a reputed al-Qaeda
sympathizer and President Saleh's half brother. Persistent news reports and
published interviews have charged that General Mohsen used gas as a weapon
during the conflicts in Sa'ada.
Highly respected religious scholar
Mohamed Almansour wrote a letter to President Saleh in March 2005 which stated,
"We condemn all things that happened in the previous months such as
excessive use of force by the Government forces and the use of internationally
prohibited weapons." In May, Alquds
Alarabia reported that rebel leader Abdelmalik al-Houthi said, "The
government attacked us with internationally prohibited weapons like chlorine
gas that caused an inability to breathe." He also referred to "colored
gas." An article in the opposition newspaper al-Shoura in June listed the
names of imprisoned children, including Bader Aldeen Abdula Moslih who was
described as "12 years old, very ill from nervous system and skin damage
as a result of chlorine gas used by the army in the first war last year." In
an internet interview the same month, a Houthi partisan and purported eye
witness described "some special missile which turns into many particles,
yellow and then red. The cloud goes up slowly. When it explodes it is yellow,
when the particles come down they are red." The cloud caused an inability
to breathe, he reported.
Yahya al-Houthi, former Member of
Parliament in the ruling party and brother of slain rebel leader Hussain al-Houthi,
wrote in an email: "Most of the injured persons have died especially those
who were hiding in Suleiman Cave. They were exposed to chemical gas…The area
surrounding Suleiman Cave is still closed by the Army to prevent any one from
taking samples to be analyzed by chemical weapon experts. The Army also burned
all bodies in that area so they don’t leave any evidence for the
international community.
They used gas in the area of Alqari
Mountain in the village of Neshoor…The result of the attack was the death of all
40 men who were protecting the area. The bodies of the dead still missing tell
now. The government forces used the tanks to destroy the graves so no one can
find the dead bodies if he or she needs to look for any evidence." Certainly
the Yemeni regime could put these allegations to rest by inviting international
inspectors into the region which remains closed off.
Selling the Port In a stunningly blatant act of economic
malfeasance, the Yemeni government recently entered into
a 30 year contract for the port of Aden with its largest competitor, Dubai
Ports International (DPI). World Bank documents state that Dubai is in direct
competition for container transshipment business with Aden. The port of Aden is
located along international shipping routes, giving it a strong advantage over
ports in Dubai which are 1600 miles away.
The majority owners of DPI also are
the managers of the Jabal Ali free zone in Dubai. DPI will pay 83.5 million US
dollars as a rent over 30 years for the Aden free zone, an area of 32 million
square meters, effectively paying less than one penny per square meter in
monthly rent. A Kuwaiti firm's substantially higher tender was rejected in
favor of DPI.
Lutfi Shatara, head of a Yemeni group
in the UK who believes the DPI award contravenes Yemeni national interest,
wrote in a letter to the World Bank, "With Dubai now involved in Jebel
Ali, Fujirah, Djibouti and Jeddah, and about to sign a concession to take over
container operations in Aden, the question must be asked, which of these ports
will Dubai favour when it comes to investment and marketing to maximize their
business? If Dubai’s recent
announcement that they will invest in new berths at Jebel Ali to reach a
throughput capacity of 55 million TEU (twenty foot container) by 2030, while
Aden is promised a capacity of 3.5 million TEU by 2035, the answer seems very
clear."
While DPI's total investment in the
port of Aden over 30 years is expected to be nearly 500 million US dollars, the
company is permitted to sell 20% of its shares in the Yemeni market, raising $100
million dollars initially from Yemeni investors to pay the rent, buy equipment,
and fund operations.
Mr. Shatara indicated in his letter
that he has "documents proving that the process involves corruption" and
his group intends to sue the Yemeni Government to stop the concession from
being given to DPI. The award of Aden Port to its competitor may have
significant negative ramifications on the future economic development of Yemen,
a country struggling with epidemic poverty and unemployment. It would seem that
those Yemenis responsible for the deal, including President Saleh, were acting
in self-interest or were grossly incompetent. Either way, the Yemeni people
have had one of their most important resources rented for thirty years with
little in way of equitable return.
Basic services in Yemen are nearly non-existent
and the basic needs of the Yemeni people are unmet, including clean water,
medical care, and educational facilities. According to the UN World Food
Program, almost half the people in Yemen do not have enough to eat. Half of
Yemen's children are physically stunted from malnutrition by age five, and 46%
never begin school. The southern, formerly Marxist region in particular has
endured an administrative economic boycott as well as collective
discrimination, exclusion, and vilification by the regime. The population of
Yemen will be greater than that of Russia by 2050.
With the official and informal
administration of Yemen so completely dominated by the president and his
family, these criminal activities and enterprises must be laid squarely at the
feet of Ali Abdullah Saleh who warrants a reassessment by the Bush administration,
especially in the context of an increasingly vocal, activist, and unified
reform movement in Yemen. Yemeni intellectuals have described the regime as "The
Government of Mass Destruction" and "An Unproductive Tyrant Regime."
In power for 27 years, Saleh recently announced that he would not seek another
term as president, but the continued repression of both the media and
opposition parties belies this statement.
Only the Yemeni people can determine
the future of Yemen. With the prospect of electoral regime change in the 2006
presidential election in Yemen, a wide variety of citizens, cutting across
traditional fault lines, have joined forces to stand up for democracy and
against the bloody onslaught of regime power. The unity of Yemen is demonstrated
by this consensus: the people of Yemen deserve an authentic democratic state
that nurtures not starves its children, and a transparent government that
operates honestly and equitably in the public interest.
Yemeni civil society has been fighting
for years for democracy and against extremist ideologies. Numerous Yemenis have
detailed, workable, concrete solutions to the myriad of issues facing Yemen. The
international community can trust in the capacity of the Yemeni people to craft
a workable state out of the ruins left by Saleh. And it should look beyond the
comfortable familiarity of a manageable tyranny to see that the citizens of
Yemen, more than any other aggrieved party, are the primary victims of
President Saleh.
* (jane.novak@gmail.com) is an
American journalist and political analyst.
Works Cited
Counterfeit money: www.alwahdawi.net/narticle.php?sid=148
Counterfeit money: Adel Al-Dhahab
email 10/5/05 11:01 P.M.
17% foreign fighters: http://www.yobserver.com/news_8247.php
Yemeni secret services sponsoring
training camps: http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Terrorism&loid=8.0.170837696&par=0
Dunnigan: http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20053159.asp
Israeli intelligence: http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2005/may/05_18_2.html
Sarah Philips: http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/17176
Al-Houthi colored gas http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=2005\05\05-09\g35.htm&storytitle=ffط§ظ„ظٹظ…ظ†:%20ط§طھظ‡ط§ظ…%20ط®ظ„ظٹط©%20ظ„ظ„ظ‚ط§ط¹ط¯ط©%20ط¨ط§ظ„طھط®ط·ظٹط·%20ظ„ط´ظ†%20ظ‡ط¬ظ…ط§طھ%20ظپظٹ%20ط®ظ…ط³%20ط¯ظˆظ„%20ط®ظ„ظٹط¬ظٹط©fff
Somolia Arms: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N07238252.htm
Asharq alawsat route to Iraq: http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=1789
Weapons shipped from Croatia: http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1084
Almansour statement: http://www.al-shoura.net/sh_details.asp?det=200
Saad statement re diesel smuggling: http://www.alwasat-ye.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1026
20 yemeni suicide bombers: http://www.althawry.org/1885/index2.htm
hunger stat: http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/112679705053.htm
hassani: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=827510&C=america
al Shoura
issue 510 jun 22 2005 page 11
Yahya al-Houth, email 10/9/05 6:58 pm
Chemical weapons description,
interview via Yahoo messenger June 2005
Weapons trafficking, phone interview
former regime official 10/8/05
Weapons deliver by AF http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_1814321,00.html
AP Yemeni military weapons used to
attack in SA and Saleh quote re terrorists: http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/12874788.htm
Cole Bombers in Iraq: http://www.yobserver.com/news_7674.php
Social Security embezzlement: http://www.yobserver.com/news_8373.php
Lutfi Shatara Letter to the World Bank
dated September 29, 2005
Tanks sudan: http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/YemenExportTanks.htm
Arms to Ethritian and Somalian
terrorist elements: http://www.dehai.org/demarcation-watch/articles/ECSS_Sanaa_axis_of_belligerence_partiii.html
Financing terrorism: http://www.tharwaproject.com/English/index.php?option=com_keywords&task=view&id=1370&Itemid=0
Overton, Yemeni military diverting
arms: http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369685
The government of mass destruction
Faisal Ameen Abu Rais, 8/9/2005 al-Shawa
Unproductive Tyrant Regime: http://www.yobserver.com/cgi-bin/yobserver/exec/view.cgi/1/8101
144 terrorist bank accounts: http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol2/html/42395.htm
Yemen no action against Zindani or 143
terrorist bank accounts
http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol2/html/42395.htm