9
December 2006
A diagram for defeat: assessing the Iraq Study Group's report
It
doesn't take long to see that the Iraq Study Group report, released on
Wednesday by a bipartisan band of old Washington sages, reads like a poor
newspaper editorial. Truffled with hopeful "shoulds and "musts,"
redolent with high Establishment piousness, it sets ambitious aims, but offers
relatively few practicable means to implement them.
However,
this is not the whole story. The ISG members have long marinated in political
craftiness. By the end of the 100-odd page report, you will wonder if we've all
been had for taking the document so literally. In fact, co-chairmen James Baker
and Lee Hamilton have handed us two things: an awkward map out of the current
mess in Iraq; but also a barrage of covering fire to justify why the United
States need not linger there for much longer. The report sets myriad benchmarks
that the Bush administration, or any successor, might readily point to as not
having been implemented when explaining why it is time to go.
The
report opens on the low side. "The situation in Iraq is grave and
deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects
can be improved." The authors call "for new and enhanced diplomatic
and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary
mission of US forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to
move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly." In parallel to this, the
Iraqi government is told that it must advance national reconciliation,
guarantee basic security, and deliver essential services. Lying in ambush is a
threat: "If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward
the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and
governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or
economic support for the Iraqi government."
This
switches on one of many warning lights in the ISG report. The Bush
administration has recently done what anyone who screws up does: It has shifted
the blame elsewhere, onto the Iraqi government. It takes considerable imagination
to overstate the merits of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, however the new
American tactic of treating Iraq as dead weight the US could really do without
is a bit thick after more than three years of occupation and the
administration's mismanagement of the reconstruction process. The ISG fails to
rectify this. It blackmails the Iraqis by giving them a choice between
implementing ISG guidelines and being abandoned - with the likelihood that
civil war will ensue.
But
if that's Baker's and Hamilton's gambit, it does not square with this passage
in the report: "Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and
is critical to US interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of [Shiite]
and Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It has the world's second-largest
known oil reserves. It is now a base of operations for international terrorism,
including [Al-] Qaeda. Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy,
influencing how the United States is viewed in the region and around the world.
Because of the gravity of Iraq's condition and the country's vital importance,
the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significant
international challenges in decades."
If
Iraq is all this, then does it make sense for the US to abandon the country if
its leaders don't play ball? Does the Bush administration have that luxury? The
answer is no, which points to a fundamental flaw in the report: It prepares the
exits in Iraq, but also convinces us why getting out might be a disaster. Worse,
the US depends on the Iraqis to create the successful context for its departure.
Success isn't much of an option, as the ISG authors have already informed us,
so what we're left with is a cornucopia of vague thoughts, where it's unclear
who or what defines the destiny of US forces in Iraq. Is it the Iraqis? Is it
the possible backlash of an "irresponsible" American withdrawal? Is
it American morale, handicapped by a realization that the US is caught in a
losing war?
This
fuzziness is reinforced by a contradiction when the authors discuss a timetable
for a pullout. They insist, "The point is not for the United States to set
timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that we oppose." Yet
that is precisely what the report later does, albeit surrounded by a bodyguard
of caveats: "By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected
developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not
necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq." This is classic
bureaucratic hedging, handing ammunition to both sides in the debate. The
administration will highlight the conditionality of the ISG's 2008 deadline in
order to buy itself some wiggling room; the "get out of Iraq quick" crowd
will emphasize the date. Baker and Hamilton will stress one or the other
depending on their audience. That's safe, but it doesn't bring the US any
closer to a comprehensible strategy.
The
deadline issue runs hand in hand with another crucial ISG recommendation,
namely that the US military effort be turned toward enhancing training and
support for the Iraqi Army and security forces, among whom more US soldiers
should be embedded. That's hardly an original idea, however, being a variation
on President George W. Bush's promise that "as Iraqis stand up, we will
stand down." The twist is that while "Iraqization" will suck in
more US soldiers, the payoff is that more soldiers will leave, even if the
report, pointedly, avoids addressing troop levels.
This
leads to another slapdash segment in the text - on the disarming of militias. If
the Americans are in a mindset of drawing down their forces, how easy will it
be for the Iraqi government to disband the country's militias - which requires
national reconciliation? By now, the authors have told us that both Kurds and
Shiites are uneager to engage in such reconciliation, and that "there are
many armed groups in Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms." What
they have not told us, however, is that the possibility of the militias'
changing their minds will only be diminished by the prospect of an American
departure, which could leave behind a dangerous vacuum that Iraqis would need
weapons to fill. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government is to be held accountable for
this failure.
Another
cornerstone of Baker's and Hamilton's strategy is the creation of a regional
Iraq Support Group as part of a so-called New Diplomatic Offensive. "The
United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an
international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic
effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic
Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbors."
Much
gnashing of teeth was provoked before the report's publication because Baker,
in a television interview, advocated talking with Iran and Syria on Iraq. The
premise of the ISG report, as the above passage makes clear, is that none of
Iraq's neighbors wants to see the country dissolve into sectarian war. The
authors err, however, in giving this hypothesis absolute merit, with little
appreciation for the complexity of Iranian and Syrian interests in Iraq. If a
civil war is so frightening, then it doesn't explain why Syria has
systematically destabilized Iraq by funneling foreign Sunni jihadists into the
country to murder Shiites - increasing the chances for full-scale sectarian
warfare. The same can be said of Iran, which continues to arm both of the main
Shiite militias, despite the fact that they have been involved in countless
rampages of sectarian killing.
Something
is plainly lacking in the ISG's rational reckoning of Iranian and Syrian
intentions. For one thing, Baker and Hamilton ignore that Iran's stated goal in
Iraq is to get the Americans out of the country - and perhaps the region. In an
embarrassing understatement, the authors describe the US-Iranian relationship
as "problematic," and virtually undercut their own argument for
engagement by admitting that the Iranians are "likely to say they will not
participate in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq." Tehran
would be amenable to chatting up the US all the way to Iraq's door, but that's
different than what the ISG members have in mind. They're not looking for an
American rout in the Middle East; Iran is.
Similarly,
the report's passage on Syria is so anemic, so unpersuasive, so shaky for being
loaded down with an ancillary recommendation that the US help resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict as a possible incentive to Damascus, that nothing will come of it, at
least for now. In truth, the battle was always going to be tough. Bush rejected
the idea of dealing with Syria some weeks ago, and the recent death of Lebanese
Minister Pierre Gemayel, probably the work of the Syrians or their allies,
further damaged what little legs the initiative had. What those who want to
engage Syria cannot comprehend is that its regime thrives on exporting
instability. For President Bashar Assad, normalcy in Iraq, Palestine, and
Lebanon would deny Syria a role as regional playmaker, while also forcing the
Syrian leader to dismantle the vast security edifice that keeps him in power.
Some
will defend the ISG report as a reservoir of new ideas. If you can't stomach
the whole, look at its parts. There are two problems with this. First, the
authors see their proposals as interconnected, not to be picked at selectively,
which is why their plan is so tremendously rigid. And second, few of the ideas
are original, even if some are rather good. Other than a final sequence of
detailed administrative and judicial recommendations, too much of the ISG's
advice is conventional generalization. That's because all Baker and Hamilton
ever intended to give Bush was a diagram for defeat, a device for him to go
down without losing face.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=77515#