11 January 2007

 

 

 

 

 

 

A long Lebanese movie, or just a dud?

By Michael Young

 

Michel Aoun has described the second phase in the opposition's effort to topple the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora as a "long Lebanese movie." I don't mean to be unkind, but judging from most of our country's celluloid creations, that means it will be tedious, disjointed, and that the audience will bolt before the final credits.

 

Over a month into the opposition's anti-government campaign, it is plain that the endeavor has failed. Indeed, that failure was implicitly recognized less than a week after the demonstrations started, by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. His speech, broadcast to his partisans from the crypt where he now resides, was the first sign that the Hizbullah leader had miscalculated. Nasrallah's accusations of treason directed against the majority were designed to cover for an acknowledgment that his party's mobilization had hit up against a Sunni wall. From the moment the confrontation in Lebanon was squarely framed as a sectarian one, Nasrallah had no choice but to accept the standoff this produced.

 

More intriguing was Nasrallah's threat at the time to create a transitional government, headed by a "patriotic Sunni," if his conditions were not met. Aoun echoed the same thought a few days later. Both men have been discredited by their inability to carry through on the promise. The only tool left to Hizbullah and Aoun is to wreak havoc in the streets around public facilities and ports. But this will lead nowhere since it will turn the public against the opposition and precipitate a conflict with the Lebanese Army. Reports are surfacing of splits within the opposition's ranks over strategy, and even some opposition leaders are admitting that they are in a quandary. Hizbullah can pursue its battle, but every day that goes by is another in which it must justify its ineffectiveness.

 

Nasrallah is a charismatic war leader, but his party, indeed Lebanon, is still paying the price of his decision last summer to abduct Israeli soldiers, which provoked the disastrous summer conflict. Since then Hizbullah has sought to over-compensate for that mistake - a mistake that has surely embarrassed Nasrallah in his dealings with his Iranian patrons. Iran has paid much money to save Hizbullah and continues to arm and support the party, but its leaders cannot be happy that Nasrallah has lost them their deterrent capacity along the Israeli border, that Hizbullah is now isolated in Lebanon, and that the party's actions have united Sunnis against both Hizbullah and Iran. Nor can they be happy that Nasrallah is struggling in a political system that is proving too much for him, despite his weaponry, while the international community rallies to the side of the Siniora government.

 

The catastrophic turnaround in Hizbullah's fortunes is mainly due to Syrian intransigence on the Hariri tribunal. In refusing to negotiate a quid pro quo on the tribunal, in therefore denying its Lebanese allies any leeway to maneuver on the tribunal's endorsement, Syria has created an impossible situation for Hizbullah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. This makes it more likely that the tribunal will be approved, because there is no middle ground toward which Syria can guide the tribunal process to protect its regime. It's now make or break, and given the international community's and the Arab world's annoyance with the Syrian-Iranian alliance, there is a growing prospect that Syria will lose everything. The tribunal is coming, probably with its bylaws intact unless Syria can offer serious concessions to Lebanon, to the Arab states, and to the Americans in order to save its leadership.

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What that means is that Hizbullah must not only manage Nasrallah's missteps, it must also manage those of Bashar Assad. The thing is, Nasrallah would be able to resolve his domestic troubles if he agreed to fully integrate Hizbullah into the Lebanese political game and start a process of disarmament - one that could be made to last years if that reassures the Shiites. However, the Hizbullah leader is not willing to convert his party into a wholly Lebanese enterprise, for that would be tantamount to admitting that its revolutionary momentum is dead, it would mean the party substantially breaks free from Iran, and it would leave Nasrallah as leader of an alleyway and sectarian group, to use his own words, rather than as the Che Guevara of the Middle East.  

 

Making matters worse, Hizbullah finds itself in the unenviable position today of appearing to oppose Siniora's efforts - efforts that look to be successful - to bring Lebanon billions of dollars in much-needed foreign aid and grants. This is a clash the party cannot possibly win, not after having provoked a war that cost Lebanon over $10 billion, according to some UN estimates. If the only way that Hizbullah can break out of its multiple dilemmas is by imposing a bruising economic deadlock, then it could be blamed alone for any further deterioration in the nation's finances. With its own Shiite community still suffering the impact of the war, but also facing delays in reconstruction and reimbursement, Hizbullah may also feel the sharp end of Shiite discontent before long. 

 

Meanwhile, the majority seems confident enough to open a new dossier, that of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and its possible involvement in assassinations and bomb attacks since the Syrian pullout last year. The matter is a delicate one and may lead nowhere in the near term. However, it shows the opposition groups, particularly Amal and Hizbullah, the price of isolating themselves from government decision-making.

 

In the past six weeks the government has moved ahead on the Hariri tribunal, has approved a new economic program for Paris III, and is looking into eliminating pro-Syrian networks in Lebanon. In that context, can the opposition afford to pursue an agenda accelerating its gradual meltdown as an effective force? In playing all-or-nothing politics, Hizbullah and Aoun have surrendered much of what once made them credible. Unless they reverse the fall quickly, their leverage to salvage something in the political system will fade.

 

Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=78415#

 

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