Can Lebanon
parry Syria's threats?
By Michael Young
Daily Star
staff
Thursday, July 07, 2005
One of Samir Kassir's last works was a collection of articles entitled "Syrian Democracy and Lebanon's Independence." Implicit was the notion that Lebanon could only be truly sovereign once Syria became democratic. That equation still holds with the presence in Damascus of a moribund despotism headed by President Bashar Assad, its dwindling life force provided by the mildewed wreckage of the Baath Party.
However, recent developments in Syria suggest a new quid pro quo may soon become
as pressing: Lebanon's independence for Syrian security. Typically with the Syrians, reports in recent days of a pair of skirmishes between the Syrian security
forces and alleged Islamist militants in Damascus and near the
Lebanese border elicited
more questions than answers.
While there may have been some truth in the Syrians'
allegations that they had attacked
Islamist cells providing assistance to the Iraqi insurgency, there seemed more to the episodes than
that. In the past month, the
Syrian regime has fought three gun battles with Islamists
- or so we've
been told - and even
for a leadership bent on proving
its goodwill in Washington,
there comes a point where such information suggests more a loss of control than anything else.
Kuwait's Al-Siyassa,
in a story on Tuesday, suggested the
fighting in Damascus, at Jabal Qassioun,
the mountain behind the city, was the result
of a dispute between two wings of the Presidential
Guard - one supposedly controlled by Maher Assad, the president's
brother, and the other by Rifaat
Assad, Bashar's uncle. Al-Siyassa is notoriously
wrong when it comes to Syria,
and much caution is necessary here;
however, the article highlighted the perennial problem of the regime's credibility:
after all, Syrian sources with ties to the
regime have disclosed that past brawls
in Damascus promoted as fights against Islamists - notably in the Mazzeh district last year - were actually
between branches of the security services.
It's not clear
what's happening in Syria,
but one hypothesis is that the regime
isn't overly concerned about Islamists entering Iraq; rather, it is alarmed
about their entering Syria, particularly through Lebanon, to help destabilize the Baath regime, in collaboration with revived networks of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
This may be what caused the
fighting and arrests in northern Syrian, near the
Lebanese border. Whatever the truth, the
regime's fears of arms being smuggled
into its territory explain why trucks entering from Lebanon are being delayed for days at the
border, because of thorough searches.
Despite the authorities' spin, designed to
curry favor in Washington, it's hard to believe the events
near Lebanon were solely related
to Iraq.
Kassir once referred to the decoding of Syrian affairs as "Qassiousnology"
- a variation on speculative "Kremlinology." While one can only make
educated guesses of what is happening, much information is out there, courtesy of the Syrian regime.
The first certitude is that the
recent Baath Party congress was not a step toward reform,
as Syrian spokespersons claimed, but an effort by Assad
to impose greater control over
the party and society.
The resignation of former Vice President
Abdel Halim Khaddam was the most
obvious illustration of this. It
was sold by the regime's ventriloquist
dummies as a worthwhile step in removing an unhelpful dinosaur. Perhaps it was,
but it is illusory to presume that Syria's "new guard"
is more adept at managing affairs
than the "old guard." It was the
former who bungled Lebanon, and when
it comes to democratic behavior and reform, one might again quote
what a "reformist Baathist" told journalist David Hirst for a piece
published on this page yesterday: "Bashar's new new
guard might actually have to be tougher than the
old."
Assad has also reshuffled his intelligence services. The most publicized recent move was the removal of Bahjat Suleiman as head of the internal branch of the State
Security
service, and his
replacement by Fuad Nassif.
He is the
nephew of Mohammad Nassif,
a powerful predecessor as internal branch chief, a leading figure in the Alawite Kheir Beyk clan, and a close confidant of the late Hafiz Assad. The Suleiman ouster
and Nassif's appointment were allegedly the work of Assef
Shawqat, the head of Military Intelligence and the president's
brother in law. He was recently confirmed
at his post, after being appointed
in February. Weeks ago, he began
centralizing decision-making
in his office. Shawqat also may have allies in other key positions. For example, Ali Younes, formerly of Military Intelligence,
is to be promoted head of Air Force
intelligence.
All of these
moves, and others, suggest that Assad is
consolidating his hold by rallying those closest to the regime. Unlike
his father, however, the president
does not seem to be widening his
power base, but narrowing it. He
appears to be falling back on those he can trust the
most (or thinks he can trust), both within the
family and the Alawite community, which leads to two plausible conclusions not mutually
exclusive: Assad is accumulating power to impose controlled
change in Syria; he is also doing
so to guard against what he
perceives as growing domestic threats, suggesting democratization is in no way a priority.
Where does Lebanon come
in? It is unlikely the current
Syrian regime could ever address
Lebanon as an equal; for the men in Damascus,
there is little room for a bona fide partnership in the shadow of the
demeaning Syrian practices
of the past. However, bearing this in mind, the
Lebanese must watch out for
two things in the coming months:
if Syria is threatened through Lebanon from Sunni
Islamists, then this must be stopped;
and the Lebanese
must begin preparing now for the eventuality
of deep change next door - whether this occurs through
peaceful means or violent.
These imperatives make it urgent for the Syrians to accept that continuing dealing with Lebanon
through their intelligence
services will only backfire. It delays
state-to-state cooperation,
further alienates the Lebanese, and
will not reverse the disintegration of the previous Syrian order. More disturbing, in the absence of normal relations, including
diplomatic relations, there
is little incentive in Beirut to fill a domestic security vacuum that might also harm
Syria. The reason is simple: Why lend a hand to the Syrians when
they have so readily exploited security loopholes in Lebanon of late, as the assassinations of Samir Kassir and George Hawi have perhaps proved?
Few Lebanese
would lament the demise of the Assad
regime. However, until it's clear that a peaceful transition can lead to a democratic
alternative in Syria, a new government
in Beirut must ensure that Lebanon does
not become a source of Syrian
instability, which could provoke appalling
blowback. For that to happen, Assad must withdraw what remains
of his agents, accept
Lebanon's independence, and
ensure that his neighbors are, at least objectively, on his side.
Michael Young is
opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.