9
march 2007
Deal with Syria, but first impose Lebanese sovereignty
Add
Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht to the list of dignitaries who have
left Damascus biting their fists in frustration. After meeting with his Syrian
counterpart, Walid al-Moallem, on Tuesday, de Gucht said he was
"disappointed" that Syria would not surrender its nationals to a
mixed tribunal being set up to try suspects in Rafik Hariri's assassination.
Moallem added: "If the United Nations wants anything of Syria, then it
must talk to Syria and base the statutes of the tribunal on Syrian law."
That's
revealing coming from a regime that supposedly had nothing to do with Hariri's
murder, and that often affirms its "non-involvement" in the resultant
judicial process. Thanks to Syria's continued refusal to concede anything on
the tribunal, the Lebanese crisis continues. This coming weekend the Syrians
will get a chance to practice more of their brand of diplomacy when Iraq's
neighbors meet in Baghdad to discuss the country's future. The United States
should not give Syria an opportunity there to break free from the tribunal,
which provides the only real leverage over President Bashar Assad to change his
regime's behavior.
It
is perhaps understandable that a number of policymakers and analysts in the US
feel the Bush administration's present policy of isolating Syria is going
nowhere. Their framework for saying so is Iraq. My friend David Ignatius
expressed this view in the commentary published above, pointing out that the
"administration should also start a real dialogue with Syria - and in the
process shelve any half-baked ideas about regime change that may be lurking in
the Old Executive Office Building. The Syrians pose a deadly threat in Lebanon,
which is all the more reason to be talking with them." Isolation, the
argument goes, also isolates the US. If Washington negotiates, it can use its
weight to bring about desirable outcomes.
There
are several problems with this assumption when it comes to Syria. The first is
that opening a new page with Syria is premature. If the aim of negotiations is
to advance one's aims, then Syria has shown no willingness to consider those of
the US and the UN - who told Syria in late 2004 that it was time to end its
interference in Lebanon's affairs and recognize Lebanese sovereignty. To talk
now, while the Syrians threaten Lebanon on a daily basis, would validate their
claim that threats work, and that Syria can bring envoys to its door by
spawning instability in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. That's
precisely the wrong message to send. The right message is that Syria can only
put an end to its isolation once it accepts international law - which in
Lebanon means accepting the tribunal and giving up on the dream of reimposing
its hegemony over the country.
That's
why defending the Hariri tribunal is so essential. The body has international
backing, which means that the credibility of the five permanent members of the
Security Council is tied into its success. By initiating a dialogue with Syria,
by therefore implying that the crime the tribunal is seeking to punish
shouldn't reflect badly on relations with Damascus, the US would empty the
tribunal of its meaning. Why give up this weapon when it can make future
negotiations more successful?
The
quid pro quo demanded of Assad would be a simple one, and the Saudis and the
Egyptians have already floated it in one way or another: Any effort to narrow
the Hariri tribunal's statutes, or even to improve relations between Saudi Arabia
and Syria, requires that Syria first change its conduct in Lebanon. Nor is
isolation of Syria necessarily failing. Even Syrian allies like Iran and Russia
can see that Assad's stance on the tribunal is untenable and might cost them
politically. Iran is said to have agreed with Saudi Arabia on the principle of
establishing the tribunal, even if it won't take a position that might alienate
Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin allegedly told the Saudis that if the
tribunal were blocked in Lebanon, Russia might abstain in a Security Council
vote to place it under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
A
second problem with the invitation to dialogue with Assad is that there is no
evidence Syria will get the message and alter its behavior. Here is the
Catch-22: If you engage Syria, Assad will assume this is due to his
intransigence, which will encourage him to remain intransigent in the
expectation that this will bring more rewards. The Saudis and Egyptians know
the pitfalls of this logic, but also see the Syrians caught in a more sinister
vicious circle: Because Assad is weak he must export instability, which is only
isolating him further in the region, making him even weaker.
The
Europeans, never shy about engaging Syria for the sake of engagement,
particularly with so many troops deployed in South Lebanon, are also beginning
to see the light. De Gucht's regrets echoed those of the European Union's
representative in Beirut, Patrick Laurent. He recently admitted that the EU had
"tried everything [with Syria], as did many others, employing both gentle
means and pressure." To no avail.
A
third reason to be wary of engaging Syria is that Assad doesn't have the
confidence to carry through on many of the demands that would be made of him.
The Syrian president can intimidate his domestic foes, but his authority rests
on a narrower power base than his father's. He can talk to the Israelis, but
it's doubtful that he can reach a final deal with them, since peace would mean
substantially dismantling the security apparatus that keeps him in office. He
can pretend to help stabilize Iraq, but knows that actually doing so would mean
that Syria becomes less relevant. He can claim to have played a positive role
in the Mecca accord between the Palestinian factions, but he knows that this
only came after he failed to sponsor such an agreement himself. Today, Assad
fears a Hamas exit from the Syrian orbit, which is one reason why he has been
trying to place pro-Syrian groups in a Palestinian national unity government.
And,
most important, Assad knows that if he were to give up on Lebanon finally and
unconditionally, he might face the wrath of those within his own regime who
silently blame him for the debacle of 2005. But this all begs the question:
Why, therefore, should Syria abandon Lebanon at all, or capitulate in Iraq and
in the Palestinian territories, if nothing is to be gained from these
concessions?
The
reason is that Assad, though weak, would thus be able to win his long-term
political survival. Such steps would buy him Arab and international
forbearance. A new attitude would mean less resistance to a narrowing of the
Hariri tribunal's statutes, more vital investment in Syria, a beneficial Syrian
relationship with the US and the EU; and, once Assad can broaden his power
base, peace with Israel. But building up Assad's confidence and then expecting
him to relinquish his cards makes no sense. If a power struggle with Syria is
unavoidable, so be it. With major Arab states, the US, the UN and the Europeans
on the same wavelength, it will be tough for Assad to impose his will - unless
the bell of dialogue saves him first.
That's
why the US should remind Syria at the Baghdad conference that deeper contacts
remain undesirable. Dealing with Iran on Iraq may be inevitable; dealing with
Syria is not, particularly after Assad burned more bridges to the Sunnis by
trying and failing to seize control of the Iraqi Baath Party. The Syrians have
to be made to realize that their regime can only last if they make fundamental
concessions in the region. Assad is too brittle to demand more than recognition
of his survival.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=80236#
GKronfli@aol.com Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2007 13:22:50 EST
Dream on!