27
November 2006
Don't let Syria get away with killing Rafik Hariri.
BEIRUT--The
Syrian regime is discovering what a nuisance Rafik Hariri, the late Lebanese
prime minister, can be. Last Friday, the U.N. Security Council approved a draft
plan for a mixed Lebanese-international court to try those responsible for
Hariri's assassination on Feb. 14, 2005. Damascus, the main suspect in the
crime, is palpably anxious. That anxiety played out in Lebanon 10 days ago,
when six ministers named by pro-Syrian politicians resigned rather than take
part in Beirut's formal endorsement of the tribunal proposal. The plan was
subsequently passed by a reduced Lebanese government, but the full approval
process is not over.
Five
of the six ministers who resigned were appointed by or affiliated with the two
main Shiite parties, Hezbollah and the Amal movement, while the sixth is
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's man. Their resignations came amid a struggle
for power between pro-Syrian groups and the anti-Syrian parliamentary and
cabinet majority--dating back to the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah.
While some saw the outcome of the conflict as a victory for the militant Shiite
group, that was hardly the case. Israel displayed incompetence, but Hezbollah
found itself militarily neutralized in its vital space of south Lebanon, at
least for now. The Lebanese army and international peacekeepers are deployed in
the border area, and Hezbollah cannot impose a new war on its battered Shiite
community, which continues to suffer the consequences of Israel's terrible
retribution.
With
little room to maneuver in the south, Hezbollah has tried to compensate in
Beirut by demanding greater representation in the cabinet. The anti-Syrian
majority has resisted this, arguing that the government performed well last
summer, making change unnecessary. The real issue, however, is the return of
Syrian hegemony. Hezbollah and its allies want enough ministerial seats so they
can veto decisions they dislike that go to a cabinet vote. By so doing, they
can continue to protect Syria in the Hariri investigation, and also block the
majority's policies that they don't like. A final U.N. report is due out on
Hariri's killing in the coming months (the chief investigator, Serge Brammertz,
has until mid-2007 to publish his findings), and Hezbollah fears that any
accusation against Syria might also be turned against itself.
All
this has significant repercussions for the U.S., particularly after the Democratic
midterm elections victory. Syria never accepted its forced withdrawal from
Lebanon last year, and has worked tirelessly since then to reimpose its writ
here. Now there is new hope in Damascus: Influential American voices are
suddenly suggesting a reversal of course toward Iraq's neighbors. It was music
to Syrian President Bashar Assad's ears to hear James Baker, the Republican
co-chairman of the Iraq Study Group, advocating dialogue with Syria and Iran in
an interview last month: "I don't think you restrict your conversations to
your friends." The Iraq Study Group's report, expected in the coming
weeks, will possibly include such an invitation. Syria's Lebanese foes fear
they will pay if the U.S. and Damascus cut a deal.
If
so, it wouldn't be the first time for Mr. Baker. In 1990, he was a leading
light in President George H.W. Bush's administration, which ceded Lebanon to
Syria in exchange for President Hafez Assad's agreement to be part of the
international coalition against Iraq. An inveterate "realist," Mr.
Baker is not likely to balk at negotiating with Mr. Assad if it means the U.S.
can buy some peace of mind as it transforms its presence in Iraq. His proposal
is unpopular at the White House, and last week Mr. Bush made that known to Mr.
Baker and his colleagues. However, because of his electoral defeat, the
president, pressed by a Congress avidly searching for new ideas, might find
less latitude to ignore Syria down the road.
Unless,
of course, the U.N. incriminates Syrian officials in the Hariri murder. That
Mr. Assad realizes the fatal implications of this connection was evident when
British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently sent a senior adviser, Sir Nigel
Sheinwald, to Damascus for a chat. The visit, reportedly approved by
Washington, aimed to see if Syria could be enticed away from Iran. If The
Economist is correct, and the magazine spoke to Mr. Sheinwald upon his return,
the Syrian president has four conditions: an end to the Hariri investigation, a
guarantee that the U.S. would not undermine his regime, a return of Syrian
influence in Lebanon, and the handing back of the Golan Heights, occupied by
Israel in 1967. No doubt Mr. Assad would demand much the same from the U.S. if
it ran to Damascus to "engage" him on Iraq, assuming the Syrian leader
would consider conceding to Washington in a moment of strength what he refused
when he was weak.
There
seems to be a consensus in the U.S., whether in Congress or in the
administration, that there is no going back on upholding Lebanese sovereignty
or in finding Hariri's killers. But it is not clear to many in Washington that
asking Syria and Iran for help in Iraq, if that's what the Iraq Study Group
advises, will drastically limit the administration's ability to deny both
countries' gains in Lebanon. For Syria and Iran, Lebanon is vital in their
broader quest for power in the Middle East. They will collect there on whatever
is offered to the Americans in Iraq, and the retreating administration already
has far fewer means to prevent this.
Mr.
Baker and his fellow realists, custodians of stalemate in their own way, want
the U.S. to return to its previous approach to the region, where interests
defined behavior more than values--particularly democracy. But if engagement
with Syria, or even Iran, is on the cards, then the U.S. might have to
surrender the one genuine triumph it can point to after Mr. Bush formulated a
democratic project for the Middle East: the peaceful, popular overthrow by the
Lebanese of Syria's debilitating domination. The U.S. might also find itself
having to relinquish that all-too-rare happening in the region: a vigorous
international legal process that promises to punish a state-sponsored crime.
Yielding on Lebanon will not advance American interests; it will only damage
them more, turning the severe setbacks in Iraq into a full-scale regional rout.
Wherever
one stands in the spectrum of U.S. foreign-policy thinking, the Hariri tribunal
is a mechanism that should satisfy all. Democracy defenders see in it an
institutional means of buttressing Lebanon's independence from Syria--presuming
that U.N. investigators demonstrate Syrian involvement in Hariri's elimination.
Realists will gain a splendid stick with which to force Syrian compliance with
American priorities elsewhere in the Middle East, including Iraq. The court's
mandate does not oblige presidents to put in an appearance (though there is no
immunity from crime, meaning they can be sentenced in absentia), so Mr. Assad
can be destabilized if his involvement is proven, but not necessarily forced
from office. It would make him conveniently vulnerable to outside coercion.
That's
why events in Lebanon are so important. Syria's Lebanese allies are trying to
undermine the Hariri investigation from within, and are expected to escalate
their efforts very soon, maybe even this week. It makes no sense for the U.S.
to hand them more ammunition by prematurely transacting with Mr. Assad before
the U.N. completes its task and assigns responsibility for the assassination.
Mr. Young, a Lebanese national, is opinion editor at the Daily Star
newspaper in Beirut and a contributing editor at Reason magazine.
The Wall Street Journal :
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110009280