21
December 2006
Giving to Bashar Assad, and taking
away
By Michael Young
While in Beirut this week Senator John Kerry remarked, in reference to any future discussion between the United States and Syria: "Lebanon is not on the table, nor is the Hariri tribunal. So what do you
do with Bashar Assad? What does
he want?" The statement was
reassuring on Lebanese sovereignty, but also showed why wondering
about what to do with Assad can often
end up being another way of saying: What do you give Assad?
That resigned logic was entrenched in the Iraq Study Group report, drafted largely by a onetime US ambassador to Syria, Edward Djerejian. Like James Baker, his former
boss, Djerejian is nostalgic for when the United States could cut deals with a reliable despot in Damascus. That the despot's
son is entirely unreliable when it comes to respecting
his engagements has done little to discourage Baker or Djerejian. Basing themselves on a shallow assumption that Syria wants to avoid civil war in Iraq (even though it
may be the
state most responsible for triggering one), the "engagers" have put little
effort into showing how Assad might be
compelled to end his destabilization of Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. Particularly for a Lebanon threatened by a Syrian return, more clarity is vital.
But then again, when it
comes to Lebanon, neither the Bush administration nor the ruling
March 14 coalition, Syria's prime prey, has convincingly outlined the kind of leverage
that might prevent the Syrians
from reasserting their control over the country. When Kerry asked Lebanese interlocutors for their views on Monday, few of the responses were practical from the perspective of a Democrat-led
Congress eager to have more
of a say in the Bush administration's regional policies.
Syrian insecurity is often cited as an obstacle to a kinder more generous Syria. For example, writing in The Financial Times last week, Robert
Malley and Peter Harling of the International Crisis Group saw insecurity as a reason for Syrian intransigence: "Damascus and Tehran
want a different relationship with Washington. But
at a time when they believe the
US seeks to weaken them, they are unlikely to bend to its requests."
That may be true. But the question that the authors
and others have not answered is whether
a heightened sense of security will make
Assad more willing to surrender valuable political cards that he feels
his intransigence has allowed him to accumulate. Syria's support for Hamas, its
blunt refusal to recognize Lebanese sovereignty as outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, and its destabilization
of Iraq, have all paid handsome
dividends as far as Assad interprets things, though the reality
is doubtless more complicated. The president can also
see that his "insecurity" is what brings
people to his door with political offerings and words
of comfort - even as his behavior has changed not at all.
Perhaps a more promising avenue isn't
to reduce Assad's sense of insecurity, but to heighten it so that
his regime will make damaging
mistakes that can be exploited.
This is fraught with risks, but the Syrians, like
many others, only really respond
when their interests are at stake.
Take their decision to
back the Lebanese opposition's campaign to overthrow or neuter Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government.
The fact that the bulk
of the opposition is Shiite
unfortunately, though predictably, has led to an angry Sunni counter-reaction.
Yet as any follower of Syrian politics will tell you, Sunni mobilization,
whether in Lebanon or Iraq,
might one day consume the minority Assad
regime. In that case, why shouldn't the
international community and
Syria's Arab adversaries
use the potential dangers
of such mobilization as a
stick to effect behavior-change
in Syria, in a way that reassurances could never do?
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From the Lebanese
perspective, the greatest difficulty with Syria today is
arriving at a modus vivendi
on bilateral ties that can satisfy
both sides. The Syrians simply
won't negotiate. They haven't hidden their desire to return to Lebanon and still
refuse to deal with the
country as a sovereign entity.
When it comes
to the Hariri tribunal, Assad
has put no prospective exchange on the table, though there are those in March 14 who would probably
be willing to swap watering down the tribunal's statutes for verifiable guarantees of Lebanese independence and their own
personal safety. In the absence of Syrian flexibility, however, March 14 will stick with the tribunal as the only weapon it
can deploy, and for the moment it has the backing
of the international community.
A
third source of leverage that could be
used to alter Syrian behavior is Arab
antagonism toward Syria's
alliance with Iran. It would be naive
to suppose that so beneficial a relationship would be abandoned
by Assad for the uncertain prospect of negotiations
over the future of the Golan Heights. If anything, the Syrian
leader will assume that the Iranian connection
is what brought
the Golan back to international attention. On the other hand, as Assad watches developments
in the Palestinian territories, he knows that somewhere
in there lies an ominous
message: The Sunni Arab states are striking back against Iran's Arab allies - such as Hamas. While Assad will not soon discard his
Hamas comrades, if that Arab counter-attack gains momentum, it would
be unwise of the Syrian leader to remain on the wrong
side of the fight, particularly if the latter is increasingly
defined by sectarian
identification.
Assad has overestimated his
vulnerabilities, but in so doing has underestimated Syria's ability to shape and benefit from
a stable region. By refusing
to give up on Lebanon, the Syrian leader has hardened the wall
of anti-Syrian hostility in
the country, whose leading proponents are now Sunnis backed
by an Arab world anxious
about Iranian intentions. By encouraging
Hamas' rejectionism, Assad
has made the task much harder for those advocating renewed Golan negotiations. By tying Syria's
fortunes to those of Tehran,
he has eroded the earlier Arab
consensus that would have better protected his regime from
the Hariri tribunal.
It may be valid for the United
States and Europe to engage Syria,
but not from a position of weakness
- which the Iraqi Study Group recommendations would almost certainly lead to. Assad has pushed his country into dangerous corridors that his father
would have never contemplated entering. This should make for a more pliable Syrian regime, as it begins to grasp
the perils that it has created
for itself. Maybe it's time
to think about taking advantage of this situation.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY
STAR.
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