28
December 2006
In praise of Lebanese
sectarianism
Praising Lebanon's sectarian system may seem odd
this end of year, as sectarianism seems closer than
ever before to devouring the society. But that's precisely what we should
do, because political developments
in recent weeks have shown that sectarianism,
for all its demonstrable shortcomings, is the only system reflecting the true nature of social relations, imposing
humility on all the
parties, and offering the Lebanese a pluralism so abysmally
lacking elsewhere in the Middle East.
Over the decades, eliminating sectarianism has come to be associated
with the brisk air of modernism. There is some
justice in the claim. A society cannot
truly flourish if every aspect of life is reduced to one's religious affiliation. Promotion by sect
usually means a state bureaucracy where merit is lacking.
Confined to confessional boundaries, politics or public
service means that the most ambitious
must either tie their fate to sectarian political leaders to get somewhere, or emigrate. And the rigidities
of sectarianism are such that Lebanon seems
forever stranded in a never-never land of deal-making, profit-sharing and pie-slicing.
Perhaps. But sectarianism is
also the one thing that has made Lebanon more or less democratic in a region stifled by despotism. Because the religious communities
are more dominant than the
state, power is diffused, so that no single political actor or alliance has ever been able to impose its writ on all of society. In the
absence of absolute victory,
the system has, of necessity,
embraced perpetual
compromise - or, when one of the
sides, or both, has ignored the rules,
collapsed into crisis. The dissatisfied
have often looked for
salvation in a strong state, leading
to a longstanding rivalry between supporters of muscular
state institutions and supporters of traditional sectarian leaders. Not
surprisingly, the latter
have usually won out because they
better reflect the country's social disposition,
which cannot long abide exclusive central authority.
If
independent Lebanon were a morgue, it would be filled
with aficionados of robust statehood. President Fouad Chehab was the
first to use the army and intelligence services against the traditional
leaders, and he got nowhere; nor
did his successor,
Charles Helou. Bashir
Gemayel, president-elect for three
weeks, had a similar antipathy for sectarianism, and hoped to use the state to tame and transcend
it. He was murdered before he could do much,
but his brother Amin applied a likeminded rationale, and within two years
he had crashed.
Emile Lahoud was elected in 1998 to break the sectarian leaders on behalf of the Syrian regime,
but in 2000 he suffered a withering defeat at their hands in parliamentary elections. Now Lebanon must deal with two more dogged
"statists," Sayyed
Hassan Nasrallah and Michel
Aoun, and both are being reminded daily that they
cannot wantonly bend Lebanon to their own advantage.
A
few years ago, Nasrallah, in an Ashura speech, decried the Lebanese
arrangement, saying it was characterized by "leaders
of alleyways, of confessional
groups, of districts." Instead of this, Hizbullah's leader declared,
Lebanon needed "great men and
great leaders." Unfortunately,
he got it
exactly wrong: The bane of Lebanon
is not leaders of alleyways,
but great men - or more precisely mediocre men who believe
themselves to be great. Michel Aoun has, similarly,
juggled contradictory
sentiments: a contempt for sectarianism
deployed alongside claims
to be a paramount sectarian representative, all wrapped up in an audacious fancy that he
is a man of destiny who, as the self-anointed
embodiment of national salvation, can
overcome Lebanon's untidy
divisions.
In
both Nasrallah's and Aoun's
dislike of the system is a sometimes defensible loathing for wheeling and dealing
- even though the two men
are not lacking in that
talent. However, they
regard themselves as above the political fray,
better than the riffraff maneuvering
down below. Both consider an enhanced state, one they control, as the way around sectarian
bargaining, even though they are fundamentally sectarian in their outlook and
Nasrallah's ideal state looks very
different than Aoun's. There is something
deeply disturbing in their attitude: an intolerance
for diversity, for making
concessions to earn concessions, for the disorderliness of a system they would prefer
to replace with something regimented.
Aoun
and Nasrallah may be on a collision course when it comes
to their totalistic visions
for Lebanon, but in December
it was as one that they hit a brick wall in trying to bring down the government of Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora. In the face
of a unified and fuming Sunni backlash,
both men were suddenly forced
to acknowledge the red lines of sectarian
conduct. The message they heard was
a clear one: Either Hizbullah would have to limit its demands
or Lebanon would enter a
new civil war. When Nasrallah spoke two weeks ago
to assembled opposition protestors,
the virulence of his speech
partly covered for the fact that
he had seen
the writing on the wall. He
was sending word, probably to his Syrian allies, that fighting Sunnis
was out of the question - before retreating under a compensatory hail of indictments directed against the majority.
Today, Hizbullah is in a quandary.
Siniora is here to stay and Nasrallah
is absorbing the unforgiving dictates of sectarianism. Though the Hizbullah
leader may have been dragged
kicking and screaming into the alleyways of confessional politics, he now knows
that he cannot
ignore this. He is displaying modesty, in contrast to Aoun, who is beginning to sense that his
plan to take over the state is slipping
away. It is no coincidence that the Aounists
have started a parliamentary
petition condemning
Siniora's alleged abuse of the
Constitution. For weeks it
has become double or nothing
for the general's nervous followers, but by dismissing sectarian sensitivities they will almost certainly
end up with nothing.
Every few years the Lebanese must cope with an individual, party or community that ignores, disastrously, sectarian conventions. When the Maronites, the Sunnis and the
Druze couldn't get it right during the 1970s, the country descended into a 15-year war. Today, it
is Hizbullah, as prime spokesman for the Shiite community, that is making a similar
miscalculation. If conflict
can be averted,
then the party's learning a lesson will have been worthwhile: better a weak Lebanese state where communal alignments can counterbalance the hegemonic tendencies
of one side to a strong, purportedly non-sectarian state that will consistently
drift toward a disputed, therefore unstable, authoritarianism.
That said, permanent, rigid
sectarianism is not ideal. For any truly democratic order to emerge, the Lebanese must ultimately think as citizens, not as members of religious tribes. But wishing that away
will not work. The only solution is to modify sectarianism
from within, to provisionally accept its institutions while making it more flexible and opening up space for non-sectarian practices.
The Taif agreement outlines the means
to reach this end, and just
as soon as Lebanon can break free of Syrian and Iranian manipulation, just as soon as Hizbullah agrees to a process leading to its disarmament, no matter how lengthy, sectarian negotiations will become possible and the road to reform can be
taken.
Michael
Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=78015#