13 January 2006
Man of the Mountain
A Reason interview with Lebanon's
Walid Jumblatt
Michael
Young
Iran weighs heavily on Walid
Jumblatt's mind these days, as the paramount leader of Lebanon's Druze
community answers questions in his mountain palace at Mukhtara, which he rarely
leaves these days, fearing assassination by Syria. "In two weeks' time,
[Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is going to Damascus to sign a defense
cooperation agreement," he told me. "Neocons are no longer in
power in Washington, but you can find them in Tehran."
Jumblatt has gone through several
incarnations in recent months, as Lebanon seeks to break free from 29 years of
hegemony imposed by Syria, following the Syrian military withdrawal from the
country last April. He initially led opposition to the Syrians after the
killing of Rafik Hariri on February 14, but Jumblatt was also instrumental in
later cutting a deal with two pro-Syrian Shiite groups, Hezbollah and Amal, to
protect their quota in parliamentary elections during the summer. This about-face
earned him the hostility of many Christians, who felt the deal was directed
against them. That is, until Jumblatt's latest turnaround, where he broke with
Hezbollah, accusing it of supporting Syrian aims in Lebanon. This followed the
assassination last month of journalist and parliamentarian Gebran Tueni, where
it became clear to Jumblatt that no understanding was possible
with the Syrian regime—though he might conceivably have considered a good one
had it been offered.
Jumblatt's binoculars perpetually
sweep the region's political horizon to see what distant tremor might threaten
his tiny 200,000-strong community—and his authority over it. This makes the
Druze leader an insightful interpreter of the fluctuations in Middle Eastern
politics—particularly issues of interest to the United States, such as Iranian-Syrian
relations, Saudi-Egyptian maneuverings to save the Syrian regime, and the
future of Hezbollah.
Jumblatt's nightmare is that Syria
will succeed in re-imposing its control over Lebanon, with Arab endorsement. Apart
from what this would mean for Lebanon's newfound freedom, it would sound the
death knell for Jumblatt. On the day we met, he was worried about a Saudi-Egyptian
plan plainly designed to guarantee that the Hariri investigation would not
undermine Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime. Why, I asked, had the Saudis
altered course on Syria? After all, a week ago the former Syrian vice-president,
Abdel-Halim Khaddam, appeared on the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya station lambasting
Assad; a few days later, Saudi-owned media spiked several interviews with Khaddam,
and Al-Arabiya cancelled a one-on-one with Jumblatt.
"Bashar
seems to have blackmailed the Saudis and Egyptians. He seems to have said 'It's
either me or the Muslim Brotherhood' to the Egyptians; and he may have scared
the Saudis by threatening them with Al-Qaeda, which he happens to be backing in
Iraq."
Were there other explanations for the
sudden Saudi shift in direction? "There may be divisions in the royal
family," Jumblatt answered. He speculated that the foreign minister, Saud
Al-Faysal, for decades the avatar of status-quo Arab politics, may be keener to
sustain the Assad regime than another Saudi mediator with Damascus, Bandar bin
Sultan, the former ambassador to the U.S. who now heads the kingdom's National
Security Council.
Jumblatt affirmed that the Saudi-Egyptian
plan—which seeks to impose vaguely-defined "coordination" between
Lebanon and Syria on a variety of bilateral issues, and to muzzle Lebanese
media when it comes to matters Syrian—had "failed." For Jumblatt, "implementation
of such a plan would take us back to where we were with the Syrians before they
left."
Why had the plan failed? "Because
both [U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza] Rice and [French President Jacques] Chirac
have rejected any plan that might weaken Lebanon's sovereignty." Indeed,
Rice released a statement on Wednesday saying: "The United States stands
firmly with the people of Lebanon in rejecting any deals or compromises that
would undermine the [Hariri] investigation, or relieve Syria of its obligations
under U.N. Security Council resolutions… As Resolution 1559 demands, Syria must
once and for all end its interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon."
Though Jumblatt helped torpedo the
Saudi-Egyptian initiative, he seemed little reassured that the Arab states
would not again seek to save Assad's bacon. For him, however, one way to
undermine such efforts is to create an international tribunal "that alone
would have the power to call in suspects involved in Hariri's assassination,
like Bashar Assad." Jumblatt makes no bones about the fact that the
Syrians ordered the murder. "The only problem with such a tribunal," he
conceded, "is that it takes time." Plenty of time for assassinations
in Lebanon to continue.
Did Jumblatt believe the Americans
were sincere in pushing for a thorough investigation of the Hariri murder and
an end to bombings in Lebanon? "They keep telling us there is no deal [with
Syria]. But Syria is not being put under serious pressure," he answers,
insisting that the latest U.N. resolution on the Hariri investigation was not
as strong as it should have been.
The U.N. investigation is mandated by
the Security Council. I asked Jumblatt, knowing his close ties with the former
Soviet Union, whether he didn't fear a breakdown of the consensus in the
council because of Russia's refusal, along with China's, to sanction Syria."Yes,
there are those in the Russian Foreign Ministry and the army who defend Syria,
and the Russians have received gas exploration contracts from Syria." Jumblatt
also expressed skepticism that the investigating commission would soon ask the
Syrian authorities to arrest Syrian suspects, as the former head of the
commission, Detlev Mehlis, told me it would over a month ago: "I've heard
this again and again; I will believe it when I see it," said Jumblatt,
with a trace of exasperation.
The Iranian relationship with
Hezbollah is also of great concern to Jumblatt, because Hezbollah is closely
allied with Syria, is heavily armed, and because the Druze leader doesn't
believe the Lebanese government can persuade the party to disarm. According to
Resolution 1559—the September 2004 Security Council decision demanding a Syrian
withdrawal from Lebanon—Hezbollah and other militias in the country must
surrender their weapons. However, Hezbollah's arms are there partly to help
Iran. The group reportedly has thousands of rockets in southern Lebanon
targeted at Israel, to deter an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear
facilities. "According to what I have heard [from within the Shiite
community], the Iranian side in Hezbollah has gained ascendancy over the Syrian
side," Jumblatt says. An Iranian-Syrian defense treaty would only bolster
the group, making it more intransigent.
Jumblatt saw Iran as becoming much
stronger in the Middle East, thanks in large part to the Bush administration's
weakening of its historical geopolitical rival, Iraq. "Iran is going to
have the bomb. And when they do, the Arab world is finished." The Iranians
are unsettling, he warns, because "they're very patient. You know, those
who weave carpets are very patient."
Jumblatt was recently taken to task in
Lebanon for telling David Ignatius of the Washington Post: "[The U.S.] came
to Iraq in the name of majority rule. You can do the same thing in Syria."
One prominent left-wing Lebanese journalist wrote that Jumblatt was endorsing
an American invasion of Syria, where the majority is Sunni Muslim, unlike Iraq,
with its Shiite majority. "Yes, I said it," Jumblatt admits; "Why
be hypocritical? The Shiites in Iraq expanded their power under the American
occupation; but here in Lebanon Hezbollah continues to be opposed to the U.S."
He went on to observe that in the back
of the minds of some in Syria's ruling minority Alawite regime, the idea of an
alliance between Alawites and Lebanese Shiites and Christians to confront the
region's majority Sunnis was still alive. I asked, half seriously, why the
Druze had been left out of the equation. "The poor Druze, the poor Druze,"
Jumblatt muttered.
For Jumblatt, Hezbollah is,
dangerously, a "state within a state." Where can its refusal to
disarm lead? "Perhaps to the situation prevailing in the late 1960s when
the Palestinians began creating an autonomous 'Fatah-land' in southern Lebanon,
from where they attacked Israel." Left unmentioned was that this state of
affairs was a catalyst for Lebanon's civil war in 1975; though apparently
recalling that his father was a prime supporter of the Palestinians, Jumblatt
added: "At the time, Lebanese society was divided."
Jumblatt's pervasive pessimism, or
realism, is sometimes an act, since the nonstop burden of impending doom is too
much even for a man who has transacted and interacted with death since his late
20s. As if to prove that buoyancy still had its place, hours after the
interview ended I received an 11:00 pm call from Jumblatt. "Did you read
what the Americans said?" he asked, in reference to Rice's statement on
Syria; "Pretty strong." He seemed happy. From his redoubt, he could
see that the planets had momentarily aligned themselves in his favor—until they
shift again and anxiety returns.
http://www.reason.com/links/links011206.shtml
Reason contributing editor Michael
Young is opinion editor at the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.