29 march 2007
Michel Aoun can cut the Gordian knot
For months, Aoun's strategy has been to impose
himself as the Maronite no one can circumvent. Until
recently, the general sustained himself thanks to Christian frustration with
the 2005 election law and the subsequent quadripartite agreement that left
Christian politicians and groups either marginalized or playing a secondary
role. That beef was justifiable, but things began to disintegrate when Aoun found himself in the same camp as
With this in mind, it is plain that Michel Aoun
will not be president. He cannot be elected by Hizbullah
alone, though the party will use Aoun until the last
minute as a bargaining chip to slip in someone else. The majority has no
incentive to vote for Aoun because he has spent the
past months alienating its leaders. And there is no prospect that the general -
who distils polarization like no other - will be a compromise candidate, as
even Aoun's own ally Elie Skaff recognized publicly several weeks ago.
However, if Aoun's ambition to be president
has been dashed, his ability to play a leading role in selecting someone else
for the job remains stronger than ever, thanks to the general's control over a
sizable parliamentary bloc. Aoun holds the balance of
power allowing him to effectively be the kingmaker of any new president. Moreover,
by distancing himself from the predominantly Shiite opposition, he would force Hizbullah's leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Parliament
Speaker Nabih Berri to
overhaul their strategy, as neither man wants the current standoff to appear
like it is the Shiites against the rest. This could even force Berri to open the doors of Parliament. More importantly, if
Aoun joins with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, the three could together ensure that Christians have
a leading say in who will be elected, and what his or her agenda will be.
Aoun and his followers insist that their main
objective is to return the Christian community to its rightful place. If so,
the general should bite the bullet and fight the lesser battle he can win in
helping select a credible successor to President Emile Lahoud,
rather than scrape though a nasty presidential try of his own that Aoun is sure to lose.
Why should this matter? Partly because Aoun's
failure to reach Baabda will have a negative impact
on the Christian community, whose interests the general claims he wants to
advance. If Aoun plays all-or-nothing politics,
Christians will react in one of two ways, or a combination thereof: they will
abandon Aoun and blame him for his recklessness; or
they will embrace his loss as their own, and internalize his lament that
Christians no longer have a say in
Many Aounists, when you scratch below the
surface, are aware that Hizbullah will never agree to
disarm and fully integrate into the political system. By the same token, Hizbullah has no deep sympathy for Aoun
or his aims, which fundamentally contradict those of the party. Aoun may argue today that Hizbullah's
weapons are defensible, at a time when, as he sees it, there is a power vacuum
at the level of government; but it is doubtful that a President Aoun could coexist with a party presiding over a state
within a state, defended by an Iranian-funded private army. There are no legs
in that alliance, and for the moment Aoun and Hizbullah are merely using each other. The thing is, Nasrallah intends to sell Aoun
out at the appropriate moment to get something in exchange on the presidency;
but Aoun will get nothing from Hizbullah.
If anything, his partnership with the party has doomed his presidential chances.
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So here's a plan Aoun might want to consider. He
should start by holding a far-reaching dialogue with Geagea
under the auspices of the Maronite patriarch. This
would aim to reach a common set or principles that any future president would
have to adhere to - at least if he wants the approval of his coreligionists. Aoun would have to sacrifice his ambition to be elected to
the highest office himself, but he would also be in the driving seat to impose
a preferred alternative. Geagea's advantage would be
that he could buy himself a wider margin of maneuver in his alliance with Saad Hariri and the Future
movement. This would not imply breaking that relationship, which remains a
foundation for any effort to establish an independent post-Syrian Lebanese
state; but it would enhance the Lebanese Forces' credibility as a more
autonomous organization.
Once that happens, Aoun would formally ditch
the Hizbullah alliance, though he needn't break
definitively with the party. On the contrary, he could put himself forward as
the prime mediator with Nasrallah. Aoun would then ask for an "acceptable" share of
portfolios in the government. This could either reflect his parliamentary
weight, or there could be a tradeoff between the number of ministers and the
nature of the ministries offered the Aounists. This
would be a tricky stage, and would require agreement with Geagea
and Sfeir beforehand on Christian representation. In
exchange, Aoun would endorse an early timetable for
parliamentary approval of the Hariri tribunal. He
would then announce his decision to abandon the Downtown protests and fold his
tents.
A vital ingredient would be Aoun's formally
giving up his demand for early elections. The general still believes that such
elections are his ticket to the presidency. Because the opposition might get a
greater number of seats in Parliament, he feels, his presidential chances would
improve. But Aoun's calculation is based on the
erroneous assumptions that
With his bloc the swinging vote in Parliament, Aoun
would be in a very powerful position as gatekeeper to the president. And with Geagea and Sfeir on his side, he
could write a good part of the presidential program. More significantly,
Christian unanimity would mean that any new head of state could not easily
ignore Aoun once in office (the obsession of all
Lebanese kingmakers), since this would only isolate him in the Maronite community. But first, Aoun
must take the toughest decision of all: embrace modesty and accept that Baabda is his paradise lost.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=80928#