28 September 2006
Offer reform for
Hizbullah's weapons
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah often
says that Hizbullah will never use its weapons
against other Lebanese. Yet, we know the party
did so in the past, and
in his speech last Friday, Nasrallah
made it plain that
Hizbullah's disarmament was
conditional on an overhaul
of the Lebanese state. Assuredly, then, his arms are not there just to keep
Israel at bay, but also to be used as leverage
in a domestic struggle for power.
This,
somehow, was never in doubt. Nor does it
require transcendent familiarity
with Lebanon to know that because of the way the society is structured, one party's remaining armed to the exception of all the others can
only increase the insecurities of those others. And
now Nasrallah has made formal his warning. As Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh bitingly observed last weekend, this is
what Hizbullah effectively offered: Our weapons in exchange for transforming Lebanon into a virtual garrison state, where we wouldn't need
our weapons anyway, since by then the state would be largely
in our hands.
There were two jarring moments in Nasrallah's speech. His
statement, directed against Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora, that "tears don't liberate,"
was especially disingenuous. Siniora's tears began a process of ridding the South
of Israeli soldiers whom Hizbullah's actions on July 12 had
brought back into Lebanon. More disturbing,
Nasrallah's twice-repeated support for the Syrian leadership could, he knew,
only be interpreted
in one way by followers of Rafik Hariri: as an endorsement
of the late prime minister's assassins. How paradoxical
was this behavior in light of Nasrallah's rebuke
of Siniora and the government majority for their "heartlessness" in recently receiving British Prime Minister
Tony Blair.
It was Samir Geagea's moment last Sunday, when the Lebanese
Forces held a rally in
Harissa. Maronite nationalism can
be as difficult to stomach as Shiite nationalism, and Geagea could
have been more appeasing in his
wartime recollections, given
that his old enemies are today his staunch
allies. The Lebanese Forces
leader played a dual game
of unity and polarization - unity with other forces in the Christian camp from which he had
been alienated, such as Amin
Gemayel's Kataeb Party and smaller shreds
of the Lebanese Forces; and polarization, in an effort to
use tougher rhetoric as a means of picking up ambivalent Christians increasingly displeased with Michel Aoun's ties with Hizbullah.
Yet for all his parochial
calculations, Geagea laudably placed his response to Nasrallah in the context of the one document that retains legitimacy
as a guide out of Lebanon's impasse: the Taif agreement. Few could argue with his logic
in responding to Nasrallah's demand
for a strong state: How could
a strong state come about, Geagea asked, when
one side undermined this through its
creation of an armed state within a state?
Shoring up Taif was also the aim
of Saad Hariri's response to Nasrallah
on Tuesday, in the third of
a triptych of responses from the March 14 coalition. Where Geagea, Hariri, and March 14 in general have shown considerably less imagination, however, is in their definition
of Taif. As viewed today by the parliamentary
majority, the agreement is mainly a device
to disarm Hizbullah. Fair enough. But there is another
aspect of Taif that must also be put on the table by the majority: political reform.
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Nothing prevents March 14 from
making the following proposal, as a backhand to Nasrallah's weapons bid: The Lebanese
communities must open a new phase of national
dialogue on the basis of Taif,
involving Hizbullah's disarmament
and political reform - reform that would aim
to give the Shiite community, and whoever else deserves
it, a greater share of political representation. The condition for
initiating this grand bargain would be
Hizbullah's first surrendering
its weapons. Why? Because after what Nasrallah said last Friday, many non-Shiites have little
confidence he will not use his weapons to impose Hizbullah's
agenda on them.
There are complications involved. Taif outlines the
creation of a deconfessionalized
Parliament, which would alarm Christians.
However, sooner or later the issue will resurface anyway, and just
as Geagea insists that Shiites must accept the implacable logic of Taif, others will
readily turn this around and
remind Christians what Taif means
for them. That's why it's preferable to start the ball rolling
now, building on the goodwill inside the majority, through
a parallel process of
discussion among the March 14
forces, to reassure Christians.
This reform process must include, as compensation to the community, promises of a new, confessional
Senate, as Taif outlines, where Christians and Muslims are represented in a 50-50
ratio, and administrative decentralization.
Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah
Sfeir would be an essential participant in the
effort.
Where would the Aounists fit into this? Nasrallah, Geagea and Hariri had their moment, now it's Michel Aoun's turn. October 13 fast approaches, and the general, in a spirit of conciliation, might use
the anniversary of his removal from
Baabda in 1990 to finally embrace Taif. What
better way to do so than to invite his new comrades, those who had
lustily applauded his ouster in Taif's name, to a ceremony attended by Emile Lahoud, who, in the name
of Taif, too, led the Lebanese
force against Aoun that day?
Taif has fallen victim
to multiple coups, to borrow from
former minister Albert Mansour.
Nasrallah has no interest
in an agreement that will disarm him, even
if it means delaying expanding Shiite representation in the state. Better to increase Shiite power
by leveraging his weapons, he thinks,
than through a compromise that would damage the Iranian priorities
defended by Hizbullah. Aoun
cannot bear Taif because it reminds him of his past defeats.
Nor will he accept a text
that gives presidents less than the ample power Aoun would seek were
he to return to Baabda.
That's
why March 14 alone is in a position to breathe new
life into Taif. Political reform in exchange for Hizbullah's guns. That's the
deal. It would remind Shiites that they can only
gain from the party's disarming, but also lose if it
refuses to do so. The
Shiite community and Hizbullah are two different things. Taif can prove
just how much.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY
STAR.
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