26 January 2006

What's gotten into you Michel Aoun?

By Michael Young

What is it about Michel Aoun that makes him so infuriating when he reacts to someone else's death? From Samir Kassir to Edmond Naim, without forgetting Gebran Tueni, Aoun has a talent for saying or doing exactly the wrong thing on such occasions, for routinely exposing himself as indifferent to the victim's fate, for making it seem that what matters only is how the demise in question affects Michel Aoun's fortunes.

Aoun may be too honest to feign bereavement for people he cares little for. Fair enough; at the end of the day the general is pursuing a presidential project, and exile has made him more of an egoist than ever. But was it necessary for Aoun to announce his plan to run a candidate in the Baabda-Aley district before Edmond Naim's body had cooled? He's since retreated, but perhaps no better was to be expected from someone who dispatched two of his parliamentarians to attend a speech by Hassan Nasrallah on the 40-day anniversary of Tueni's death, though Hizbullah remains devoted to a Syrian regime accused of being responsible for Tueni's murder, as well as that of Rafik Hariri. Beyond the displeasure Aoun's actions provoke, there lie deeper calculations, and contradictions.

Aoun's calculations are sometimes sensible. Having watched his opposition partners Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri betray him in favor of an electoral pact with Hizbullah and Amal last summer, the general accepted the impermanence of alliances. His doubts were only confirmed when Hariri declined to endorse an Aounist as justice minister while Fouad Siniora formed his government, only to accept bringing in President Emile Lahoud's choice, Charles Rizk. Aoun went into "opposition," though he realizes today that this status leaves him with few means to pursue the presidency. That's why he's now calling for a government of national unity, even though spawning such a monster in the present atmosphere would only illustrate national disunity.

Aoun's most controversial endeavor - playing the balance between Hizbullah on the one hand, and the March 14 coalition on the other - can be justified on sectarian grounds. In his inner chambers Aoun argues that it makes no sense for Lebanon's Christians to take sides in what is increasingly a Sunni-Shiite struggle over Lebanon's future. Better for the community to be on good terms with everybody and avoid the dangers of sudden reversals in alliances. Indeed, only three weeks ago Hariri supported a draft agreement reached in Saudi Arabia that would have resolved the ministerial crisis by having the government consent to open-ended resistance by Hizbullah in South Lebanon. Had this been accepted, Aoun could argue, what would have been the gain for him to take a lead in criticizing the Shiite parties?

Walid Jumblatt was the first to reject the Hariri-Hizbullah accord, and, sensing frailty on Hariri's side, the Druze leader followed this up with a call for closer relations with Aoun. Already, however, the March 14-Aounist rapprochement is in trouble because of mistrust between Jumblatt and Aoun. Aoun remembers that Jumblatt tried to act as mediator between the March 14 coalition and Hizbullah before the general did; and Jumblatt believes Aoun returned to Beirut thanks to a contract arranged with Syria. Aoun's initial reaction to Naim's death, his harsh criticism of the Siniora government last week, and his cajoling of Hizbullah, to the extent that he recently, outrageously, justified the kidnapping of foreigners by the party during the 1980s, have all since shaken relations with Jumblatt. And this is where Aoun's contradictions come in.

If Aoun's intention is to avoid political attachments that might weaken him politically, then why did he so hastily declare he would advance a candidate for the by-election in Baabda-Aley after Naim's death? The general may have backtracked, but wasn't it obvious to him when he made the announcement that his contender was likely to have Hizbullah's support, and that this would force Jumblatt to either sponsor a rival or very grudgingly accept whomever Aoun chose? Either way, Jumblatt was certain to take offense, and the Aounists would be beholden to Hizbullah for its votes. This hardly qualified as a policy of independence.

Machiavelli wrote that "a prince ... wins prestige for being a true friend or a true enemy." Aoun's persistent neutrality will only guarantee that both the March 14 coalition and Hizbullah continue to mistrust him. But worse, he has shown himself incapable of clearly defining a position on Lebanese sovereignty, the one thing that won him national credibility. He no longer mentions Syria critically anymore, though he still claims it was his actions that forced the Assad regime to remove its forces from Lebanon. He can stomach a relationship with Hizbullah, which has made no bones about its fidelity to Iran and Syria, even though he is privately said to be worried about the party's allegiances. Where is the consistency here? (Speaking of which, how delicious it was to hear Aounist parliamentarian Ibrahim Kanaan declare on Monday that his movement opposed any kind of foreign intervention in Lebanon, when Aoun once took exaggerated pride in being among the midwives of the U.S. Congress' Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.)

At the end of the day, Aoun's strategy will fail because he is working at cross-purposes. To be president, he needs to have Hizbullah on his side; but of what value is that support if he is regarded as unreliable by the parliamentary majority? Aoun doesn't want to commit the Christians to alliances they might later regret; but how does that square with his teaming up with Syria's friends and agents in Lebanon? Aoun believes he is manipulating Damascus and its allies so that he can be president; but, more often, he seems to be their tool to divide the March 14 coalition - with a car-bomb perhaps following as his recompense.

Aoun has hit a brick wall in chasing his political aspirations, otherwise why would he be so impatient for a new government? He's beginning to sense that political independence is not the same thing as sullen isolation. But there is much vindictiveness in the man, and a destructive urge to go against the grain when it's not necessary to do so. With things now clear in Lebanon, with Syria's strategy obvious and perilous, aren't Aoun's stabs at subtlety just instances of his missing the point about where his country's interests lie?

Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.

Copyright (c) 2006 The Daily Star

Your Comments

"Joe Hasrouni" <jmhasrouni@adelphia.net>

Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2006 11:48:14 -0600

You hit it right in the center. General Aoun, indeed, failed the aspirations of many Lebanese.

Few days ago I read his speech delivered in front of the American congress couple of years ago. What a changed man he is.

He is not trust worthy. He is selfish. He is without vision for the future of Lebanon. He miscalculated a lot of developments.

If he is to run for re election now, I doubt his party will receive the 21 seats in the Lebanese parliament. In the last

Elections, people voted for the old general Aoun. The recent general Aoun is sure a changed man.