20 January 2006
A Tale of Two
Countries: Defining Post-Syria
Lebanon
When Shiite ministers recently “suspended” their participation in
the Lebanese cabinet, though without resigning, it highlighted
an increasingly apparent reality
in post-Syria Lebanon: Two powerful camps coexist today. One, led by Hizballah, in alliance with the Amal
movement, sits atop a Shiite community generally, though not unanimously, supporting their positions. The other reflects a cross-communal parliamentary majority, the cornerstone
of which is the Sunni-led Future Movement of Saad Hariri, son of the
murdered former Lebanese
prime minister Rafiq Hariri.
This dichotomy
is imperfect. Beyond sectarian affiliation, other fault lines
divide the political actors, most importantly their attitude toward Syria. However, since the Syrian
military withdrawal in April 2005, it would be fair
to say that Lebanon is being
buffeted by two broad visions for the future, and that the
sectarian backdrop to this contest is
mainly Sunni-Shiite, not Muslim-Christian, which was the main divide
before Lebanon’s civil war began in 1975.
Two Visions
for Post-Syria Lebanon
The Hariri
vision is based on the classic urban
merchant ideal, in which Lebanon is
to be transformed into a liberal investment hub pursuing unhindered transactions with the West and
the Arab world. Muslims and Christians
must coexist in friendship,
though the conservatism pervading this approach means
the dictates of sectarianism are respected. Relations
with Israel are to be governed by the 1949 Armistice Agreement, but no permanent agreement can be signed
before all the Arab states accept peace. Proponents of this vision want the truth about who killed Rafiq
Hariri, believe the Syrian regime was
responsible, and have few qualms about seeing Damascus punished, whatever that means
for regional stability. This
vision is not strictly a Sunni one, but Sunnis are its main proponents and believe it
embodies the values of the late prime minister.
The downside, and a potentially serious one, is that very
different Sunni groups coexist under the
Hariri “big tent.” Rafiq Hariri always highlighted the urbane moderation of his vision, but he could never completely
conceal that, as a strong Sunni leader, he also appealed
to radical Sunni Islamists and a Sunni underclass,
both more likely to think in harsher sectarian terms than the pragmatists
Hariri preferred to advertise.
Against this stands another vision, associated with the two Shiite parties—Hizballah and, far more ambiguously, the depleted Amal movement.
This outlook is characterized by mistrust of the West, particularly the United States, and a desire to pursue the armed
struggle against Israel, both in Lebanon and the Palestinian
Authority. Proponents of this vision emphasize that Shiites have always staunchly defended Lebanese nationalism, have never cut deals with the outside,
and proved their bona fides
by expelling the Israelis in 2000. They refuse to
regard Syria as an enemy, and recall that
it was under
the Syrians that Shiites were first given a prominent
role in Lebanese political life. Economically, the parties oppose deep privatization of public utilities.
Shiite employment in state institutions has been the paramount instrument of
communal promotion in recent years.
For poor Shiites, Hariri’s “merchant
republic” offered few inducements. Even spatially, the community is concentrated
in areas far from the rebuilt city center—the jewel in the
crown of Hariri’s reconstruction of Beirut.
Many Shiites
embrace this outlook, and specifically
back Hizballah because, for the
first time after decades of marginalization, the community is
respected. No more ideological
than others, Shiites nonetheless regard Hizballah’s militancy
a badge of honor, and a legitimate lever with which to demand more in intersectarian bargaining. That is why
they feel that UN efforts to disarm Hizballah will merely weaken their
community once again. This dovetails with Hizballah’s own fear that,
without weapons, it would be
just another sectarian organization, forced to abandon its towering ambition to be a regional vanguard in the struggle against Israel and the
United States. Arms also allow Hizballah
to fulfill an implicit contract with Iran, whereby its threat
to Israel from southern Lebanon can help deter an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. Neither the party
nor its supporters sees a contradiction between
Hizballah’s claim to be a guardian
of Lebanese sovereignty and its alliances with Iran and Syria.
Goodbye Syria; Hello What?
Even before Syrian soldiers
began pulling out of Lebanon, that prestidigitator
of Lebanese minority politics, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt,
had grasped that the aftermath
would be shaped by the struggle between the Hariri camp and Hizballah—between
Sunnis and Shiites. That is why
he sought to mediate between the two, hoping
to enhance his own authority. The practical impact of this was Jumblatt’s engineering
of a consensus around a controversial
law governing parliamentary elections in summer 2005. The law gerrymandered districts so that Hizballah
and Amal could maintain large blocs in the 128-seat parliament, despite the Syrian
departure, while Jumblatt and Hariri expanded their sway.
The initial
losers were the Christians, whose most powerful politician,
Michel Aoun, was left out
of the deal. However, the angry backlash
in the Christian community was such that
Aoun, who had just returned from
exile, swept all seats in the Christian heartland, establishing his own substantial bloc. Aoun has tried to remain nonaligned in the Hariri-Hizballah faceoff, but his electors deeply
mistrust Hizballah’s relationship
with Syria, compelling him to strengthen his ties with the
Hariri-Jumblatt alliance.
After the elections, Jumblatt’s strategy was to continue collaborating with the Shiites in a new government. The Druze leader induced the inexperienced Hariri to approve the re-election of Amal leader Nabih Birri as
speaker of parliament, though
Birri had been a main prop of Syrian hegemony. And when
Hariri’s associate, Fouad Siniora,
formed a government, he made sure Hizballah and Amal received
key portfolios—the first time Hizballah entered the cabinet. However, this was
an unnatural marriage. Soon, the compromise between the Hariri-Jumblatt
camp and Hizballah and Amal turned
into a virtual divorce.
The professed reason was passage, by a cabinet majority
vote led by Hariri’s and
Jumblatt’s ministers, of a decision
asking the UN to form a tribunal “with an
international coloring” to try
those responsible for Rafiq Hariri’s murder. Hizballah and Amal,
at least publicly, declined to sanction the decision and suspended
their participation in cabinet sessions. In fact, the dispute went deeper, capping
a period of palpable tension as Hizballah
and Amal refused to adopt positions that might harm
Syria. Damascus fears an international or mixed tribunal because it would have the
power to convict Syrians, without
the Syrian regime’s being able to control the outcome. The
Shiite ministers were also displeased with Siniora’s running of cabinet sessions, where he often
outmaneuvered them. He understood they
could not resign, since Hizballah views its participation in the government as institutional cover to resist surrendering its arms.
Deadlock prevails to this day, with no clear
sign when a solution might be forthcoming.
Hizballah sought to make Hariri back an agreement that
would have traded a Shiite
return to the cabinet for Hariri’s approval of a resolution defending against the party’s disarmament.
Hariri, rejected this, spurred on by the versatile Jumblatt, who, after failing to break Hizballah away from Syria, became
the party’s most vociferous critic.
No consensus exists
on a vision for Lebanon. Hizballah’s strategic alliances with Syria and, more significantly, Iran make
improbable a serious dialogue on disarmament,
which the party’s leaders consider an
existential threat. Nor does Hizballah feel an urge to compromise, since
it retains support among Shiites. The Hariri-Jumblatt tandem, in turn, controls a slight majority in parliament, but suffers from the
physical absence of Saad Hariri, who
lives outside Lebanon, fearing assassination. Moreover, Hariri is said to be
under pressure from the Saudis to be
more conciliatory with Syria, since Riyadh
does not want events in Lebanon to destabilize the Syrian regime. The sectarian contours of the Hariri-Hizballah rivalry are sharpening, and while violence remains unlikely, the fight for Lebanon’s soul will continue for some time to come.
Michael Young is
opinion editor of Lebanon’s Daily Star newspaper and a contributing editor at Reason magazine.